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INTRODUCTION

Nine years after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreements ended United
States participation in the Vietnam War, CBS television reporter Mike
Wallace publicly accused General William Westmoreland, the former
commander of United States forces in Vietnam, of serious and inexcusable deceit with regard to Westmoreland's official conduct during that
war. On a news program aired on January 23, 1982, Wallace claimed
that Westmoreland's alleged deceit had assisted Communist military
forces in obtaining battlefield success in the Tet Offensive of 1968.'
According to CBS, Westmoreland had engaged in a conspiracy to suppress and alter critical intelligence concerning the Communist enemy.
CBS alleged that Westmoreland had deceived not only the United States
people but also his superiors in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United
States Congress and President Lyndon Johnson2 when Westmoreland
adopted an estimate of enemy strength-what the military calls the Order of Battle -- that was lower than it might have been had Westmoreland included certain Communist civilian organizations in the tabulation.
CBS claimed that Westmoreland's motivation in refusing to authorize
the proposed higher overall strength figures had been crassly political.
By showing Communist combat strength as less than it actually had
been, CBS alleged, Westmoreland had intentionally nourished hope
among decision-makers in Washington that the South Vietnamese and
their United States allies were on a road to victory. According to CBS,
these hopes were illusory. The result of Westmoreland's supposed deceit
was, therefore, only to prolong a useless and tragic conflict.
This Article will contend that the law of war obligated Westmoreland
to accept lower numbers for the military Order of Battle because the
persons under consideration for inclusion were arguably noncombatant
civilians entitled to the protections that the law of war reserved for
nonbelligerents. To support this conclusion, this Article will first discuss
the necessary distinction, as embodied in the law of war, between combatants and noncombatants. Next, it will discuss the circumstances of
1. The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception (CBS documentary, Jan. 23, 1982).
2.

R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD 5-6 (1986).

3. The Order of Battle served to identify the enemy units so that American commanders might know against whom they were fighting and how strong their opponents
might be; to avoid surprise; and to select appropriate tactics to defeat enemy units in
battle.
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combat that Westmoreland discovered when United States forces entered
the war to fight one-on-one with Vietnamese Communist units. It will
then discuss Westmoreland's personal obligations under the law of war
and present the record of his response to those obligations. Finally, this
Article will conclude with an analysis of the controversy over who was to
be included in the Order of Battle.
Neither CBS nor Westmoreland's other critics, on whom CBS relied
for the accuracy of its allegations, ever expressed concern over application of the law of war to the the Order of Battle dispute. Westmoreland
did express such a concern, and this concern guided his decision-making
in the dispute.
The controversy over how Westmoreland's Command, the United
States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), should have
defined the enemy in the Vietnam War and estimated the enemy's
strength arose in May 1967, when Major General Joseph McChristian,
the MACV Chief of Intelligence Analysis and Assessment, proposed reporting sharply increased enemy troop strength. In particular, McChristian suggested reporting an increase in the number of Communist supporters in guerrilla and other irregular units.
Part-time and unarmed Communist supporters living in rural villages
and hamlets had been organized into units denominated as self-defense
and secret self-defense forces. Self-defense units undertook various security duties in Communist-controlled communities. Secret self-defense units
included persons performing self-defense functions but living in government-controlled areas. Their participation in the Communist-led insurgency was to be kept secret.
For several years before May 1967, the MACV had included the selfdefense and secret self-defense forces in its Order of Battle estimates of
the total Communist effort. The number of individuals the MACV had
ascribed to those forces had not changed in several years, however, because the MACV did not take them seriously and paid them no
attention.
The MACV had taken its original Order of Battle figures from the
South Vietnamese nationalists' estimates of enemy strength and unit organization. The South Vietnamese had included the self-defense and secret self-defense groups in their list of enemy forces. The South
Vietnamese, in turn, had taken their original Order of Battle information from the French Expeditionary forces that had fought the
Vietnamese Communists from 1946 to 1954, when the South Vietnamese
had terminated French participation in the country's defense. Thus,
French colonial officers, who were not excessively concerned for fine distinctions between combatant and noncombatant rural Vietnamese, had
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made the original decision to include the self-defense and secret self-defense in the Order of Battle. The MACV had taken for granted the
inclusion of these forces in the Order of Battle and had not analyzed its
legality under the law of war until General Westmoreland did so in the
summer of 1967."
In May of that year Major General Joseph McChristian proposed to
his commander, General Westmoreland, that the MACV sharply increase Order of Battle estimates to account for new information regarding the self-defense and secret self-defense units. Westmoreland disagreed, stating that the Order of Battle should identify participants in
self-defense and secret self-defense units only if they were combatants, a
precondition for classification that the law of war required. Westmoreland's refusal to agree with McChristian's proposal set in motion a series
of contentious meetings between military subordinates of Westmoreland,
officers in the Pentagon, and civilian analysts at the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to resolve the issue of how best to report the strength of
enemy forces in South Vietnam. These bureaucratic struggles resulted in
the adoption of Westmoreland's perspective: the MACV did not include
the self-defense and secret self-defense units in the Order of Battle because the units did not consist of combatants, but the MACV did mention the units' possible assistance to the enemy.' That Westmoreland
knowingly advocated presenting an Order of Battle smaller than it might
have been had it included the self-defense and secret self-defense units is
uncontroverted.
Removing the self-defense and secret self-defense organizations from
the Order of Battle did not imply that the United States would ignore
these units' potential and actual contributions to the Communist war effort. The MACV removed the units from the scheme of classification not
to hide such units from analysis but to place them in another reporting
system-one designed especially to measure progress and regression in
guerrilla warfare. This system, the Hamlet Evaluation Survey, attempted to measure the respective degrees of government and Communist control and organization of the population by estimating the impact
on the war of Communist supporters in the self-defense and secret selfdefense formations. Forming a relevant assessment of progress in the Vietnam War required use of both the Order of Battle and the Hamlet

4. See Major T.L. Cubbage, Westmoreland v. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by
Policy Demands? 8-14 (U.S. Army War College May 1987) (paper presented at the
Intelligence and Military Operations Conference).
5. MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, Nov. 24, 1967, Joint Exhibit No.
277, at 5, 8, Westmoreland v. CBS [hereinafter Joint Exhibit No. 277].
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Evaluation Survey: one to measure results in the war of attrition fought
against main force Communist units and another to measure the pace of
pacification and nation-building.
On its news program aired on January 23, 1982, however, CBS reported that Westmoreland had wanted to delete the self-defense and secret self-defense formations from the Order of Battle for ignoble political
reasons-to mislead his superiors and the United States public. Although
CBS presented direct testimony that political reasons were a sufficient
motivation to delete the self-defense and secret self-defense organizations
from the Order of Battle, Westmoreland felt that CBS's position had
been misleading. Contesting the published characterization of his motivations, Westmoreland sued CBS for defamation.' Westmoreland's counsel
did not attempt to introduce the law of war obligations as an explanation
for Westmoreland's behavior. Westmoreland's counsel merely denied the
CBS allegations and failed to supplant them with alternate explanations
for Westmoreland's conduct.
The Westmoreland trial ended in a compromise settlement between
Westmoreland and CBS. The terms of the settlement were sufficiently
vague as to leave unresolved in the public mind the question whether
Westmoreland had in fact an acceptable explanation for his conduct.
The Vietnam War had generated so much dissent and controversy that
many Americans readily came to believe the worst about the political
leaders and military commanders who had led them into a war that was
not won. When CBS fed on and encouraged such suspicions with its
allegations of a conspiracy to distort the Order of Battle, public opinion
placed a heavy burden on Westmoreland to account persuasively for his
conduct.
A persuasive explanation of the Order of Battle controversy exists. It
lies in the reasons why Westmoreland actually resisted the effort to have
the Order of Battle enlarged to include higher estimates for the selfdefense and secret self-defense units. Unfortunately, commentators have
yet to explain publicly this aspect of the controversy.
Interestingly, an astute observer of the Westmoreland trial noticed the
key to Westmoreland's motivation in arguing for lower figures in the
Order of Battle. In her account of the trial, Renata Adler observed:
As for the question of including the grandmothers and the children who
were members of the village self-defense units,... if the [CBS] program
6. Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (motion for summary
judgment). For a lengthy account of General Westmoreland's defamation suit against
CBS, see B. BREWIN & S. SHAW, VIETNAM ON TRIAL: WESTMORELAND VS. CBS
(1987).
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was right... [in alleging] that these grandmothers and children must be
included in the Order of Battle, the inescapable conclusion is that these
people were in fact army. And if they were army, and enemy army, the
opposing army is hardly to blame for trying to kill them before being
killed by them .... If CBS was right, then these "civilians" were Order of

Battle soldiers, and what appeared to be an indiscriminate
massacre of
7
noncombatants becomes more like an act of war.
What Renata Adler surmised to be a logical and moral truth constitutes the law of war, which bound Westmoreland in his capacity as commander of United States forces fighting in South Vietnam. One can find
the proper explanation for Westmoreland's conduct in the legal requirement that he separate, as best he could, civilians from enemy combatants,
the better to protect civilian lives and property.
II.

THE LAW OF WAR

A.

Generally

As with all law, the law of war constrains human behavior to achieve
an end. The end that the law of war seeks to achieve, however fitfully, is
reduction of the use of violence. The law's objective is to reduce violence
to the minimum amount necessary to impose one's will on an adversary.
Commentators often refer to the principle that encapsulates this policy
of minimal force necessary to attain one's objective as "proportionality." '
To be proportional, the military means used must not be excessive in
relation to the ends sought. The use of unnecessarily violent force violates the rule of proportionality. Proportionality also demands that combatants use force against that which directly negates or impedes the efficacy of their force. The proper objects of force are the force and will of
the adversary. Defining the limits of what is adversarial, therefore, becomes central to the legitimate use of force and constitutes an important
part of the law of war.
The corollary principle that in war, combatants must distinguish civilian lives and livelihoods from adversarial, military lives and endeavors
arises from the reasoning behind proportionality. This principle evolved
with the rise of the nation-state as the principal form of human political
organization, a process that began in the seventeenth century with the
rise of absolute monarchies in Western Europe and culminated in the
twentieth century with the creation of the United Nations as the legal

7.
8.

R.

ADLER,

See M.

supra note 2, at 36.

WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS

119-20 (1977).
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regime for international order.9
The eighteenth century French political philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau first noted the need to distinguish between the armed forces of
a sovereign government and the inhabitants of territory in which war is
occurring. He wrote:
War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and
State, and individuals are enemies only accidently, not as men, nor even as
citizens, but as soldiers; .

. .

. Finally, each State can have for enemies

only other States, and not men; ....
.... The object of the war being the destruction of the hostile State, the
other side has a right to kill its defenders, while they are bearing arms;
but as soon as they lay them down and surrender, they cease to be enemies
or instruments of the enemy, and become once more merely men, whose
life no one has any right to take. Sometimes it is possible to kill the State
without killing a single one of its members; and war gives no right which
is not necessary to the gaining of its object."
During Rousseau's lifetime the Swiss writer Emmerich de Vattel
wrote an elegantly articulated treatise on the law of nations.1 1 Vattel
admitted that states may consider women and children who are subjects
of a hostile state to be enemies. Vattel pointed out, however, that such a
classification does not justify treating women and children like men who
bear arms or who are capable of bearing them." For Vattel, the law of
nations, which should constrain the actions of sovereigns, establishes
rights in the conduct of war that extend only as far as necessity and the
exigency of the case demand, but no further. 3 Whatever a sovereign
does beyond the demands of necessity is "faulty, and will be condemned
at the tribunal of conscience."14 For example, wrote Vattel, it is not necessary to use force against women, children, the aged and the sick because they offer no resistance. Consequently, he concluded, we have "no
right to treat their persons ill, or use any violence against them, much
less to take away their lives." 15 Persons capable of bearing arms may live
in perfect safety as if they were friends of an occupying military force,
E. ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
53 (1979).
10. J. RoussEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 10-11 (G. Cole

9.

See

CON-

FLICT

trans.

1950).
11.

E.

DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NA-

TURE (Northampton, Mass. 1820).

12. Id. at 388.
13.

Id. at 412.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 417.
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provided they submit to the rules and regulations that the predominant
power imposes on them.1 Regarding rights of waste, destruction and
pillage, Vattel concluded that "[a]ll damage done to the enemy unnecessarily, every hostility which does not tend to procure victory, and put an
end to the war, is a licentiousness condemned by the law of nature."1 "
In 1836 Henry Wheaton wrote an analysis-of international law."8 In
it he stated that Vattel's position, which distinguished between those who
fought in a war and those who did not in order to direct force only
against the former, had been adopted "by the unanimous concurrence of
all the publicists of the present age." 9 He summarized the emerging law
of war as follows:
Those who are actually in arms, and continue to resist, may be lawfully
killed; but the inhabitants of the enemy's country who are not in arms, or
who, being in arms, submit and surrender themselves, may not be slain,
because their destruction is not necessary for obtaining the just ends of
war.

20

Under this view, members of the civil government, women, children, cultivators of the earth, artisans, laborers, merchants, men of science and
letters, and generally all other public and private individuals engaged in
the ordinary civil pursuits of life are spared the direct effects of military
operations. 2'
The United States protected noncombatants from the use of force in
war long before other nations did so. In April 1863, during the United
States Civil War, General Halleck of the Union Army promulgated a
code of war utilizing rules drafted by Francis Lieber, a professor of international law at Columbia University. 22 Article 22 of Halleck's code
states:
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has
likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile

16. Id. at 418.
17. Id. at 434.
18.

H.

WHEATON,

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Da Capo Press 1972) (1st

ed. Philadelphia 1836).
19. Id. at 249.
20.

Id. at 250.

21. Id. at 251-52.
22. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber and promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President
Lincoln, Apr. 24, 1863), reprintedin LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45-71 (R.
Hartigan ed. 1983).
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country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and
more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person,
property and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.2 3

In 1868 European powers recognized the principle of protecting civilians. The preamble to the Declaration of St. Petersburg Renouncing the
Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight noted that combatants must strike a balance between "the necessities of war" and "the laws of humanity." '24 The preamble also said that
"the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy."25
To sustain the principle of distinction separating combatants from
noncombatants, it became necessary for states to require that persons
seeking protection intended for civilian populations not conduct themselves as members of a sovereign armed force. In 1880 the Institute of
International Law adopted the Oxford Manual, article 1 of which states:
"The state of war does not admit of acts of violence, save between the
armed forces of belligerent States. Persons not forming part of a belligerent armed force should abstain from such acts."26
B.

The Hague Conventions

In 1899 a conference of sovereign states convened at the Hague to
draft provisions limiting the conduct of armies during times of war. The

states agreed to declarations regarding the use of balloons," asphyxiating
gases,2 s and expanding bullets2" and adopted a convention regarding recognized laws and customs of land warfare. 30 In 1907 a second conference

23. Id. at 49.
24. Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, preamble, 138 Parry's T.S. 297, reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLiars 95 (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds. 1981).
25. Id.
26. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OXFORD MANUAL (1880), reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 24, at 37.
27. Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of Discharge of Projectiles from Balloons,
July 29, 1899, 187 Parry's T.S. 456.
28. Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Parry's T.S. 453, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR

36 (A. Roberts & R. Guelff eds. 1982).

29. Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July
29, 1899, 187 Parry's T.S. 459, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 28, at 40.
30. Hague Convention II Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403, 1 Bevans 247, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
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occurred at the Hague to implement a suggestion of United States President Theodore Roosevelt that states place limits on the quantities of
weapons they purchase to fight their wars. The participating states failed
to agree on arms limitations at the second conference, but they did manage to adopt thirteen conventions and one declaration. The fourth convention (Hague Convention IV) restated with slight modifications the
provisions of the convention the states had adopted in 1899 and became
the first generally acknowledged, contractually binding international code
of legal warfare.3" It gave definitive expression as international law to
the principle of distinction in warfare.
Chapter 1 of section I of Hague Convention IV incorporates the principle of distinction by setting forth a definition of belligerents. The definition states that belligerents are the proper objects of warfare. 2 In general, the provisions of Hague Convention IV reflect a desire to define
belligerents as those individuals responsive to the commands of a sovereign political power. Their status as belligerents arises from their function as agents of the entity that has war powers-the sovereign state.
Other individuals not acting as agents are not entitled to make war.
Under Hague Convention IV, the rights of warfare thus pertain only to
certain persons: (1) those serving in armies; (2) those in militias and
volunteer units if they are under the command of a person responsible
for their behavior, wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly and conduct their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war; and (3) peaceful inhabitants of a territory
if they take up arms spontaneously to resist invading troops and, in so
doing, carry their arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
This definition separates those who make war from those who do not.33
Under the Hague Convention IV nonbelligerents are entitled to protection from belligerents, who must follow specific duties specified in the
Convention such as the obligation in article 22 to agree that means of
injuring the enemy are limited.34 Article 23 goes on to protect enemy
property from destruction and seizure, unless the necessities of war imperatively demand the property, and to safeguard the legal rights of citizens of the hostile party in a war. 5 Belligerents cannot, under article
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 24, at 63.
31. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.

18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631, reprintedin DOCUMENTS
LAWS

OF WAR,

Hague Convention IV, supra note 31, arts. 1-3.
Id. art. 1.
34. Id. art. 22.
35. Id. art. 23.
32.
33.

ON THE

supra note 28, at 44 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention IV].
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23(h) of Hague Convention IV, abolish, suspend or declare inadmissible
in court the rights and actions of nationals of the hostile party.3" Article
25 prohibits belligerents from attacking or bombing, by whatever means,
undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.3 7 Nonbelligerent
structures are thus set apart fron properties that a party can lawfully
attack or bomb. Except when they are to set in motion a ground assault
simultaneously, article 26 requires commanders to do everything in their
power to warn residents of an incipient bombardment. 8
Under article 27, those besieged by a hostile force can mark with distinctive and visible signs buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or
charitable purposes and historic monuments and hospitals. 9 As long as
the besieged residents are not using these places for military purposes,
the sites are off-limits to wanton bombardments. Besieging commanders
must take all necessary steps to spare, as far as possible, such structures.
4
Article 28 prohibits pillage in all circumstances. 1
Section III of Hague Convention IV protects the daily circumstances
of civilian populations from belligerent abuse. Article 43 requires an
army that has occupied hostile territory to restore and ensure public order and safety for the people of the territory while respecting laws previously in force. 4' The Convention forbids belligerents from compelling
residents of an occupied territory to furnish information about the hostile
army. Under article 46 a belligerent must respect the family honor,
rights, lives, private property, religious convictions, and practices of persons in occupied territories.4 2 Under article 50 a belligerent may not inflict a penalty on people of an occupied territory to punish them for the
acts of others, unless the people were jointly and severally responsible for
the wrong.43 Article 53 restricts belligerents to the confiscation of the
hostile state's property only if it involves cash, funds, realizable securities, arms, stores and supplies, means of transport and other movable
property that the belligerents might use for military operations.44 The
ninth convention of the 1907 Hague Conference includes analogous provisions regulating naval bombardment in articles 1 and 2.4

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. art. 23(h).
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 26.
Id. art. 27.
Id. art. 28.
Id. art. 43.
Id. art. 46.
Id. art. 50.
Id. art. 53.
Hague Convention IX Respecting Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of
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The Geneva Conventions

After World War II the United Nations made a major effort in Geneva to codify numerous provisions giving protection during hostilities to
the wounded or sick on land or sea, to.prisoners of war and to civilians. 6
With a premonition of conflicts to come, each convention that the United
Nations promulgated in Geneva (Geneva Conventions) contains an article that sets minimum rules for the restraint of violence in armed conflicts not of an international character. Previously, the law of war-for
example, the Hague Convention IV-had not applied to civil wars
where domestic factions struggled to seize the sovereign powers of a
state. These conflicts were not between or among states and thus did not
call for the application of laws binding only on sovereigns in their relations inter se. In 1949, however, an article common to the four Geneva
conventions brought such conflicts within a state under some rules of
legal restraint. The principal rule that article 3 of each convention sets
forth requires that "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities"
should "in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth, wealth or
any other similar criteria."4 7 Belligerents are to avoid subjecting noncombatants to violence to life and person and, in particular, to murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, and outrages on personal
dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment. Tribunals other
than regularly constituted courts using the judicial guarantees recognized
as indispensable by all civilized peoples are not to condemn noncombatants to penal sentences and executions.
War, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 1-2, 205 Parry's T.S. 345, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 28, at 94, 95.
46. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, reprintedin DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 28, at 17192 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in DocuMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 28, at 194-213 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in DocuMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 28, at 216-70 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 28, at 272-326 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention] (the Geneva Conventions entered into force for the United States on
February 2, 1956) [collectively hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
47. Id.
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In perhaps the most explicit expression of the principle of distinction
to date, the governments meeting in Geneva drafted and adopted a special convention, the fourth Geneva Convention, to protect civilian persons in times of war."8 The fourth Geneva Convention applies to "persons," an inclusive category not requiring a cumbersome or subtle
application to factual situations.4 To maintain definitively the principle
of distinction, article 4 of the fourth Geneva convention provides that if
the third Geneva convention, which concerns the humane treatment of
prisoners of war, protects certain individuals (that is, if the persons are
belligerents), then those persons cannot avail themselves of the protections that the fourth Geneva convention mandates for the safety of civilians.5 0 A person whose welfare is subject to the discretion of an enemy
power is to be either a belligerent, in which case the third Geneva convention applies, or a nonbelligerent, in which case the fourth Geneva
convention applies.
The third Geneva Convention specifies the proper treatment for prisoners of war in conflicts of an international character.51 In setting forth
who can avail themselves of such treatment, the third Geneva Convention necessarily affirms the principle of distinction between belligerents
and nonbelligerents. The third Geneva Convention retained the definition of belligerent from the Hague Convention noted above, but includes
several additions. 2 Of subsequent relevance to Westmoreland in the Vietnam War is the third Geneva Convention's inclusion of organized resistance movements in the definition of belligerents. The third Geneva
Convention mandates, however, that parties should treat such movements
as belligerents only if the movements are under the command of a superior responsible for their behavior, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and conduct their operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war.5" Again, the attempt
was to fashion international rules of warfare that narrowed the category
of participants to those accepting an agency relationship vis-A-vis a political entity exercising sovereign powers.
To provide for cases where determination of belligerent status is in
doubt, article 5 of the third Geneva Convention requires that a competent tribunal, not field commanders or soldiers in the heat of battle,

48. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 46.
49.

Id. art. 4.

50. Id.
51. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 46.

52. Id. art. 4.
53. Id. art. 4(A)(2).
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should determine whether persons who have committed belligerent acts
in fact belong to belligerent forces or units listed in article 5 of the third
Geneva Convention and thus deserve protection."'
Part two of the fourth Geneva Convention, which covers "the whole of
the populations of the countries in conflict," includes expansive provisions." It provides in article 15 that countries can establish neutral zones
for the wounded, sick, and civilians who take no part in hostilities.5 6 It
provides that belligerents must leave civilian hospitals unharmed. Under
article 27, the fourth Geneva Convention provides that protected persons
are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their person, honor, family
rights, religious convictions and practices, and manners and customs. 57 It
provides that belligerents shall at all times treat protected persons humanely, and that belligerents shall protect such persons, especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity. The fourth Geneva Convention reiterates earlier prohibitions in the Hague Convention against pillage, compulsory obtaining of
information, and collective punishment. 8 It also prohibits reprisals5 9 and
the taking of hostages."0
When United States combat forces entered South Vietnam in mid1965 to prevent Communist soldiers from establishing control over large
areas of the country, the law of war had thus long recognized the principle of distinction between civilians and belligerents in order to confine
warfare within the limits necessary for attacking or resisting a sovereign
enemy and its military agents and instrumentalities.
III.

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Vietnam War did not conform to the principles and distinctions
that Western European sovereigns and their legal advisors had drawn up
previously to govern conflicts between unified and centralized nationstate authorities. It began as an insurgency in late 1959 and 1960, not as
an invasion of an army of disciplined Communist soldiers in uniforms
openly carrying arms. The Communists secretly smuggled political
cadre, military commanders and arms and material into South Vietnam
from Communist North Vietnam, but the Communists organized few
54. Id. art. 5.
55. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 13.
56. Id. art. 15.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. art. 27.
Id. arts. 31, 33.
Id. art. 33.
Id. art. 34.
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open and notorious battlefield engagements. 6 Ambushes, nighttime hitand-run attacks on government posts, assassinations and political subversion constituted the principal means of attack against the South
62
Vietnamese Government.
The early phase of the war borrowed theories from the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong had advocated what the Com
munists call a people's war, involving the extensive use of guerrilla units
and combined political-military subversion of a government apparatus.
In a people's war the insurgent aggressor attacks all forces sustaining a
governing administration, including the administration's economic, cultural, diplomatic, psychological, political, administrative and educational
structures as well as the administration's armed forces and police. Guerrilla war is total war; nothing is exempt from its assault as long as the
measures taken cripple the government's will to persevere in the
struggle.6 3
In this type of warfare, the population of the state under siege becomes an instrument of insurrection and, therefore, of military significance, quite contrary to the customs and procedures of land warfare that
the nation-states of nineteenth century Europe developed, which used
only autonomously constituted armies to conduct warfare. To guerrilla
leadership, all persons are potential agents of dissent and opposition to
the governing authorities. Their contributions to street protest, to monetary coffers, to intelligence gathering, to part-time combat and to service
as full-time soldiers are all valuable and solicited by the insurgent. Insurgency makes it difficult to know just who the government's enemy
is.

64

61. Cuoc KHANG CHIEN CHONG My, Cuu Nuoc, 1954-1975: NHUNG Su KIEN
QUAN (The Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation, 1954-1975: Military
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Guerrilla warfare thus blurs the distinction between civilians and belligerents. 6" A guerrilla fighter can be more belligerent than a civilian,
but he can also be less belligerent than armed and uniformed soldiers
serving full-time in dedicated military units that house and feed them.
Should a state intern a captured guerrilla as a prisoner of war for the
duration of a conflict and then repatriate the guerrilla, or try and possibly punish the guerrilla as a criminal for revolt against a legitimate
government?66
The law of war as codified in the Hague and the Geneva Conventions
presumes that nation-states, which are the sole parties authorized to
make war, each maintain a monopoly of the means of violence within
their respective territories. The law of war presumes that local militias,
private armies, mafias, and feudal lords with armed personal retainers
are absent in the modern sovereign state.67 Only two options for participating in war are legally available under the law of war: (1) service in
the organized armed forces of a state and (2) inactivity as a citizen.
This monopoly of violence in the hands of states, when compounded
by the increasing sophistication and destructive power of the weaponry
available to modern state authorities, has created an imbalance between
states and their domestic challengers. Successful opposition to the determined exercise of state authority has become more and more improbable.
Thus the Bolsheviks could seize power in Russia only in the turmoil of
war and civic dissension. Hitler organized his own semi-military forces,
the Brownshirts, to counter the police presence used by the Weimar Republic to maintain democratic procedures. This private army, by its simple existence and through its public activities, weakened the power that
Germany's constitutional authorities held. To conquer China, Mao
Zedong and his followers required both their own armed forces and the
chaos that a foreign invasion produced.
Guerrilla warfare is calculated to redress the unequal balance of
forces between a governing administration and insurgents. First, hiding
the guerrilla fighters among the people or in remote areas and then using
them in hit-and-run tactics to strike government representatives where
1960-1964 (1973).
65. See Trainin, Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War, 40 AM. J.
INT'L L. 534 (1946).

66. The case of Lawless v. Republic of Ireland, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM.
RTS. (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts.) 438, held that it was lawful to detain a citizen without
charges or trial when the government was fighting a secret army engaged in violence and
unconstitutional activity.
67. See Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 252 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
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they are weak or unsuspecting deny government forces the tactical advantages that come from amassing troops for armed engagements. A government cannot fight that which it cannot find. Guerrilla tactics render
useless a government's superiority in terms of men and arms. Second, by
preventing government forces from establishing a monopoly of violence,
guerrilla units call into question a government's claim to sovereignty.
Sovereign status derives from a sovereign's demonstrated efficacy in ruling a territory.6 8 Vitiating that efficacy makes a sovereignty shrink to
mere war-lord status. Third, by preventing government forces from winning decisive victories, guerrillas prolong the struggle, bringing on frustration and increasingly diminishing the will of a government's supporters to sustain a relentless defense. Fourth, through political involvement
of ordinary people in a movement to change a government, guerrillas
generate good will and moral support both domestically and in foreign
countries. This support provides the guerrillas with men, money and
weapons and further frustrates those who seek to carry out the governing
administration's wishes.
Guerrilla warfare is a strategy designed to outflank the position that a
ruling authority holds so that guerrillas can obtain political power without relying extensively on conventional armed forces and traditional military tactics. The strategy forces a status of semi-belligerency on the civilian populace of the country in dispute.
As Mao Zedong and North Vietnam's General Giap recognized, however, dispersed guerrilla forces can sap a government's ability and will to
persevere without necessarily bringing the government to final collapse
or causing it to surrender to the insurgents. Larger, more conventional
forces organized along the lines that the law of war recognizes may be
necessary for an insurgency to seize and hold towns, cities and transportation routes. As guerrilla warfare becomes successful for the insurgent,
it takes on a mixed character of conventional and unconventional modes
of combat.
In 1965 Westmoreland faced a war in transition. What had begun in
1959 as a campaign of political subversion and low-level terrorism had
escalated through 1963 into a classic guerrilla war where, in Mao
Zedong's dictum, the Communist fighters were the fish swimming in the
sea of the South Vietnamese people. With the overthrow and murder of
South Vietnam's authoritarian President Ngo Dinh Diem on November
1, 1963, political chaos descended on South Vietnam for several years. A
68. See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (4th ed. 1965); J. BRIERLY, THE
LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION To THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 142
(4th ed. 1949).
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series of coups d'gtats brought revolving door governments to Saigon as
government military units became defeatist and poorly led. Street demonstrations between rival Buddhist and Catholic adherents further undermined each government's credibility. Taking advantage of the deteriorating government position, Communist units grew in number and size,
fighting less in the guerrilla mode and more in conventional battles from
fixed locations with heavy weapons and much ammunition. Resupply
and support services for the Communist forces, now more like an army
than ever, became more cumbersome.6 9
In late 1964, eager for victory, the North Vietnamese began sending
units of their own army into South Vietnam for the coup de
grace-seizure of the highland mountains in the middle of the country.
In response, United States President Lyndon Johnson authorized a
bombing campaign of North Vietnam to demonstrate resolve that the
United States would not abandon South Vietnam and to impede the
southward movement of North Vietnamese forces. Then, during May
and June of 1965, conventional Communist units defeated soundly a
large number of South Vietnam's regular army battalions, leaving South
Vietnam without adequate defenses against the growing Communist
power.7 Westmoreland then requested United States and third country
combat units to resist the Communist attacks. In July 1965 President
Johnson decided to commit forty-four such battalions with appropriate
support units to the war effort and, thereafter, to send Westmoreland
additional forces as needed to prevent the Communist conquest of South
Vietnam. 1
At that time Communist forces were organized in a variety of units
with different allocations of armaments and separate functions. Some
units consisted entirely of highly trained and heavily-armed men serving
as full-time assault troops. Of these units, some were entirely commanded and staffed by North Vietnamese soldiers, whom the Communists had recruited, trained and sent from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. In many cases these units were part of the People's Army of North
Vietnam and retained their unit identification name after they entered
South Vietnam. Other such main force units consisted of South
Vietnamese men recruited and trained in South Vietnam and led either
by North Vietnamese officers or by South Vietnamese followers of the

69.

U.S.
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Communist leadership in North Vietnam. These South Vietnamese units
most frequently carried names that the Communist-led but nominally
independent National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF)
had given them. In addition, the Communists organized rear-echelon,
noncombat, military units to supply the armed units assigned to permanent combat responsibilities with food, ammunition transportation and
communications. 2
Regional NLF commanders organized less well-equipped guerrilla
units from South Vietnamese supporters of the NLF. These units operated generally within the confines of an assigned village, district or province. When not engaged in fighting, the soldiers in these units lived in
and among South Vietnam's rural population, where they could find security to do so. 73
The NLF also organized unarmed units to assist the guerrilla bands
in controlling the rural population. These auxiliary units were called
self-defense and secret self-defense units and assault youth teams, and
their service to the Communists was nominal; many of them were
women, children and the elderly. 4
An unarmed, non-military structure of political cadre directed the entire Communist effort. These cadre included secret adherents living undetected amidst civilian populations and individuals assigned public roles
in Communist-controlled villages. The cadre set goals for Communist
efforts, shaped Communist propaganda campaigns, recruited new members for the NLF from among uncommitted South Vietnamese and collected money and supplies to finance the Communist war effort.75
Supporters of the Communist war effort thus included everyone from
completely hidden and unknown civilian spies and sympathizers through
unarmed gophers and part-time soldiers to full-time, battle-tested belligerents. The principle of distinction in the law of war does not recognize such a continuum; rather, it merely demands, somewhat simplistically, that military commanders
separate combatants
from
noncombatants.7
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WESTMORELAND'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF WAR

As American combat units entered the conflict in South Vietnam, th6
application of the law of war to the conflict became unclear. Was the
Vietnam War an international war, to which the Hague and Geneva
Conventions would apply? Or was the war a civil conflict to which only
the law of South Vietnam, article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and
United States laws regulating the conduct of United States soldiers
would apply?
Legal commentators were unable to revolve this issue. Two law review notes written in 1965, for example, provided no clear answer. After
considering whether North Vietnam and the NLF should be bound fully
by the Geneva Conventions and common article 3 in particular, one
commentator concluded: "The fact that there is legitimate disagreement
over the applicability of the Geneva Convention suggests that the virtually universal adherence to the [Geneva] Convention is misleading.""7
Similarly, another author concluded, "But it is fairly clear that under
present circumstances the full benefits of the [Geneva] Convention do not
apply in all cases in which participants in the Vietnamese conflict are
captured by another participant."7 " As late as 1970 and 1971, legal commentators continued to debate how the Geneva Conventions applied, if at
all, to the Vietnam conflict, such as whether they applied to Vietnamese
inhabitants of My Lai when they were confronted by United States combat troops."
Several participants in the Vietnam conflict resolved any doubts as far
as their own actions were concerned. Unilateral declarations by several
governments that their forces would observe the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions brought into effect certain applications of the Geneva Conventions. On June 11, 1965, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), which is responsible for the due implementation of the
third Geneva Convention, asked North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the
NLF and the United States each to clarify its willingness to adhere to

77. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisonersof War in Vietnam, 80 HARV. L. REV. 851, 868 (1967). See generally 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1969).
78. Note, The Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict,
5 VA. J. INT'L L. 243, 249 (1964).
79. See Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 OR. L. REV. 260 (1970);
Paust, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident: A Response to ProfessorRubin, 50 OR. L.
REV. 18 (1971). See also D. KHAIRALLAH, INSURRECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 203-10 (1973).

1988]

WESTMORELAND v. CBS

the four Geneva Conventions."0 The ICRC noted that "[p]arties to the
conflict shall respect and protect civilians taking no part in the hostilities,
they shall abstain from attack against such persons and subject them to
no form of violence."8"
On August 10, 1965, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk replied for the United States: "The United States Government has always
abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in the Geneva conventions and will continue to do so. In regard to the hostilities in Viet Nam,
the United States Government is applying the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions .. ."82 Secretary of State Rusk also noted, however, that
those involved in aggression against the Republic of Viet Nam rely heavily
on disguise and disregard generally accepted principles of warfare. From
the outset it has therefore been difficult to develop programs and procedures to resolve fully all the problems arising in the application of the
provisions of the Conventions. Continued refinement of these programs
and procedures in the light of experience will thus undoubtedly be
necessary."3
On August 11, 1965, South Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Doctor Tran
Van Do, replied to the ICRC that the South Vietnamese Government
was fully prepared to (1) respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which it had ratified, (2) cooperate with the ICRC, and (3) provide "the most humane treatment" to Viet Cong prisoners, who were
Communist supporters with South Vietnamese citizenship. 4
On August 31, 1965, the North Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter that did not reply to the ICRC inquiry but which
instead accused the United States of committing war crimes and crimes
against humanity in its military actions. In particular, the letter asserted
that Americans had "indiscriminately bombed hospitals, schools, road
transport stations, markets, villages, fishing vessels, churches [and] pago-

80. Letter from ICRC to the Governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
the Republic of Vietnam, the United States, and the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam (June 11, 1965), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 1171 (1965).
81. Id. at 1172.
82. Letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Samuel Gonard, President of ICRC
(Aug. 10, 1965), reprinted in 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 447 (1965).
83. Id. During its own civil war, the United States Government had conceded belligerency rights to soldiers of the Confederate Armies, granting them prisoner of war status
rather than traitor status out of humane generosity rather than under compulsion of law.
Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U.S. 48, 51 (1884).
84. Letter from Dr. Tran Van Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Viet Nam, to AndrE Durand, Delegate General of ICRC (Aug. 11, 1965) (original text
in French), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 1174 (1965).
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das, . . . massacring large numbers of innocent civilians" in violation of
the fourth Geneva Convention. 5 The North Vietnamese thereby noted
their partial agreement with the third Geneva Convention on the protection of prisoners of war, a reservation that left them free to deny prisoner of war status to United States pilots convicted of war crimes.86 The
Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated, however, th~t the North
Vietnamese intended to treat prisoners humanely in accordance with domestic law. In other words, the North Vietnamese stopped short of adhering to the international law of war.
The NLF did not reply to the ICRC but gave assurances that it
would treat its prisoners humanely."s The NLF spokesperson denied the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the NLF in its operations
because it was an insurgent force that had not participated in adopting
those legal instruments. 8 At a 1966 conference in Manila, all states opposing North Vietnam's campaign of violent attack against South Vietnam's right of self-determination declared that the Geneva Conventions
applied to the conflict in Vietnam. 9
The law of war contained in the Hague and the Geneva Conventions
applies directly to the Government of the United States and does not
directly bind individuals working for that Government. Though human
rights declarations and conventions provide individuals with claims to
protection from abuse by sovereign governments, international law remains primarily a law that declares the rights and obligations of sovereign states. The domestic laws that sovereigns enact govern individuals.9"
In one area of behavior, however, individuals are directly responsible
to the international community for the consequences of their actions. If
individuals commit war crimes or crimes against humanity, as defined by
the multi-state tribunal established at Nuremberg after World War II,
then the individuals must stand trial and, if found guilty of such crimes,
suffer punishment.9 '
Article 6(b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal

85. Letter from the North Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the ICRG
(Aug. 31, 1965), reprinted in 5 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 527 (1965).
86. THE LAW OF WAR 164 (R. Miller ed. 1975).
87. 5 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 638 (1965).
88. Id.
89. See 2 PENTAGON PAPERS, supra note 70, at 607-08.
90. See J. BOND, supra note 76, at 49, 61; U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7); Charter of the
Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 18, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No.
2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 68, at 48-50.
91. London Agreement on War Criminals, Aug. 8,1945, 3 U.S.T. 1238, E.A.S. No.
472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
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(Nuremberg Charter), which created the tribunal to try individual leaders of the Nazi Government and the Nazi army who had fought in
World War II, defined "war crimes." 92 Article 6(b) prohibits "devastation not justified by military necessity," murder or ill-treatment of civilian populations and wanton destruction of villages.93 The United Nations General Assembly affirmed the terms of the article in the following
94
year.
The United States Government, through the Department of the Army,
promulgated Field Manual 27-10 (Manual) to clarify international legal
restraints, as contained in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the
conduct of hostilities. 5 The Manual describes its purpose as being "to
provide authoritative guidance to military personnel on the customary
and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land."98 The
Manual then adds a cautionary note of legal formalism: "[Those provisions of the Manual which are neither statutes nor the text of treaties to
which the United States is a party should not be considered binding
upon courts and tribunals applying the law of war.1 97 The basic effect of
the law of war, according to the Manual, is to "place[] limits on the
exercise of a belligerent's power . . . and [to require] that belligerents
refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes and that they conduct hostilities with
regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry."9' 8 The United States
Government has also adopted the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
which provides for the punishment of military officers and enlisted personnel who break the law and commit crimes. 99
In Chapter 3 the Manual reiterates the Geneva Conventions provisions relating to prisoners of war. In Chapter 5 the Manual sets forth
Geneva Conventions provisions as they relate to civilian populations.
Section 56 of the Manual provides further guidance on the extent of
permissible devastation wrought by United States forces:
The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of
war. Devastation as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not
92.

Id. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(b).

93. Id.
94. G.A. Res. 95, 1(2) U.N. GAOR (55th plen. mtg.) at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236
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sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonable close connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the
enemy's army."' 0
Chapter 8 of the Manual discusses war crimes. It defines war crime
very broadly to include any violation of the law of war committed by an
individual, including individuals who conspire, incite or attempt to commit war crimes.' In section 501 the Manual makes commanders such
as Westmoreland responsible for war crimes their subordinates commit,
such as when "troops commit massacres and atrocities against the civilian population of occupied territory or against prisioners of war."'0 2
Under section 501 a commander is responsible for all war crimes committed pursuant to his directive. He is also responsible for all war crimes
committed by persons under his control if he had actual knowledge, or
should have had actual knowledge, of the commission or the attempted
or planned commission of such crimes, and if he failed to take the necessary and reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the law of war and
to punish violations thereof."0 3
In section 504 the Manual lists examples of war crimes. The list includes "firing on localities which are undefended and without military
significance," "use of civilian clothing by troops to conceal their military
character during battle," and "pillage or purposeless destruction.''14
The United States Supreme Court opinion In re Yamashita provided
an additional source of guidance to Westmoreland concerning his responsibility to prevent his subordinates from committing war crimes. "' The
case involved General Yamashita, who was in command of the Fourteenth Army Group of Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines at
the end of World War II when United States forces landed there to
recapture the country from the Japanese. After his surrender, the United
States put Yamashita on trial before a United States military court. The
United States charged Yamashita with personal responsibility for one
hundred and twenty-three alleged acts of violence, cruelty and homicide
committed by forces under his command, including the deaths of 25,000
unarmed noncombatants in the Batangas Province without cause or
trial.'0° The United States Supreme Court, after hearing Yamashita's

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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FM 27-10, supra note 95, at 23.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
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Id. at 14.
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plea that his trial was illegal, held that because the purpose of the law of
war is to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality, commanders cannot neglect to take reasonable measures for the protection of such persons. 10 7 The Court thus found that the fourth Hague
Convention imposed an affirmative duty on commanders to protect civilian populations." 8
The nature of the United States presence in Vietnam also constrained
General Westmoreland's actions as a commander. United States forces
were present in Vietnam at the invitation of the South Vietnamese Government, and they were subordinate to its sovereignty.' 0 9 United States
forces were not invaders or belligerents opposing the Government of
South Vietnam. They were present to support the South Vietnamese
Government and to help it defeat an armed attack on its sovereign authority. The United States and the South Vietnamese had agreed on December 23, 1950, when the French were still fighting the Communists
and before the States of North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam) and South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam) had emerged
with autonomous legal personalities under international law, that United
States forces would serve in the above-mentioned capacity."' Successor
South Vietnamese Governments, which relied heavily on United States
military and economic assistance, had honored the agreement. United
States forces thus could not wage war against the South Vietnamese
Government or its nationals.
V.

WESTMORELAND'S RESPONSE

Nothing in the Manual or the provisions of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions gave Westmoreland clear rules to follow in the novel combat situations that he faced when United States forces arrived to fight in
the fluid, complex, partially guerrilla, partially conventional war then
being waged in South Vietnam. The Hague and Geneva Conventions
were designed to apply where the distinction between belligerents and
civilians is self-evident. This conceptual distinction was often hard to
make when confronting the war tactics that the Vietnamese Communist
Party used. Nevertheless, Westmoreland took several important steps to
ensure that his forces would observe the principle of distinction basic to
the law of war.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 15.
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Westmoreland's Strategy

Westmoreland first sought authority from his superiors to pursue a
strategy of force deployment that would minimize civilian casualties. On
June 7, 1965, Westmoreland spelled out to the United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Washington a concept of deploying United States combat forces away from the people of South Vietnam in search and destroy
missions designed to find and then fight in isolated combat either large,
conventional enemy units or defended, self-contained enemy military bases. Both targets were legitimate under the law of war."' The phrase
"search and destroy" encapsulated the older infantry formula for tactical
deployment drawn from decades of experience in conventional warfare
"find 'em, fix 'em and fight 'em."
In this part of Westmoreland's strategy, United States forces would
first prevent large Communist units from capturing populated areas and
would then drive the Communist units out of South Vietnamese territory. As a consequence, the military forces of the South Vietnamese Government would concentrate their security efforts more successfully on
pacification of populated areas. As the South Vietnamese population
gained a sense of security and United States forces drove the main Communist units out of the country, South Vietnamese forces would gradually assume the burden of fighting enemy forces and United States troops
would return home. Under this strategy United States troops would not
carry the ground war to North Vietnam; they would only provide a temporary shield behind which South Vietnamese forces would grow in size
and competence and behind which elected and appointed South
Vietnamese Government officials could organize the rural areas and thus
defeat the insurgency component of the Communist war effort.
Few commentators have recognized that the United States and South
Vietnam had largely achieved these goals by the time United States
forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1972 and Communist forces invaded
South Vietnam in the Easter Offensive of that year."1 2 In his book recounting the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam, Communist
General Van Tien Dung reveals that the 1973 to 1975 build-up of Communist forces that attacked South Vietnam in the latter year included no
guerrilla component.1 1 3 There were no guerrilla forces to mention because South Vietnamese force had defeated them. General Dung even
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admitted that by 1973 South Vietnamese forces "had taken a stride
ahead in organizational strength."" 4 This was a euphemism for North
Vietnam's military defeat within South Vietnam by the end of 1972.
The only way the Communist leadership could accomplish its goal of
territorial conquest was to invade with North Vietnam's entire army
three years later. Another Communist document, an official history of
the war written by the North Vietnamese army, confirms Dung's
admissions." 5
In June 1973 the Central Committee (Committee) of the Vietnamese
Communist Party met to review the situation and plan the ultimate conquest of South Vietnam, even though the recently signed Paris Peace
Agreement made such a goal illegal. The Committee concluded that the
pacification program of the South Vietnamese Government had seized
control of the populated areas and needed to be defeated. This indicated
the Communists had conceded that, by 1973, they did not control the
population of South Vietnam."' As the Committee observed:
[T]here were some policies we were not yet able to carry out, so we still
allowed the loss of population and land; had not yet been able to overcome
the imbalance between the main-force troops and the local troops and between the concentrated forces and the military and guerrilla forces; the
rate of the buildup of the strategic rear area was still slow; and difficulties
were being encountered in building-up the liberated areas."'
The Communists had not penetrated South Vietnamese Government areas very deeply, according to this history, and they had not coordinated
their political forces in South Vietnam.
The NLF leader who defected to the West after the North
Vietnamese victory, Truong Nhu Tang, confirmed General Dung's admissions, albeit obliquely. After 1970, he wrote, the structure of the
NLF became less central to the war effort."" As a NLF leader, Tang
had found himself stranded that year in the middle of the wilderness in
Cambodia, driven out of South Vietnam. By the end of 1971 the only
Communist successes that NLF Chairman Huynh Tan Phat could report in his annual address to the NLF leadership had occurred in Laos
and Cambodia. Phat had to acknowledge that the pacification program
had devastated the NLF infrastructure within South Vietnam."" In
114. Id. at 9.
115. People's Army History, supra note 61, at 161-62.
116. Id. at 161.
117. Id. at 162.
118. TRUONG NHU TANG, A VIETCONG MEMOIR 189-93 (1985).
119. Id. at 201.
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North Vietnam, Communist general Vo Nguyen Giap no longer spoke
of waging a guerrilla and political war but of fighting only a regular war
with North Vietnamese troops. The Communists had lost the guerrilla
war; Giap had only the main force war as a tactical means to impose his
will on South Vietnam.
As early as 1969, the year United States troops began to withdraw
from Vietnam, the Communists had faced serious setbacks. The history
of the war that the North Vietnamese Army wrote acknowledged subsequently that the Communist Party's Politbureau had admitted in April
1969 to encountering many difficulties with regard to troop strength and
assured access to supplies-key indicators of weakness for Communist
1 20
forces.
When United States troops entered South Vietnam in 1965 to contain
a growing Communist main force military drive, however, future success
had been hard to envision. On June 14, 1965, Westmoreland elaborated
on his concept of tactical operations. 12 ' He wrote Washington that the
people of South Vietnam needed two different kinds of security: first,
security from large Communist combat forces, including those arriving
from outside the country; and second, protection from guerrillas, assassins, terrorists and informers. Westmoreland stated that United States
forces would contribute to providing security against the first kind of
threat, but added that only the South Vietnamese could succeed in providing the second kind of security. 122 He thus proposed to deploy all
United States armed forces and the Marine and Airborne battalions of
the South Vietnamese armed forces against what he called "hard core"
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, so as to permit the concentration of other South Vietnamese forces in heavily populated areas. 2 3 "We
should," he wrote, "generally concentrate United States forces away
from major population centers and whenever possible do the bulk of our
fighting in more remote areas.' 12 He noted that he did not envision
United States forces ever taking exclusive control or responsibility for
any province of South Vietnam.' 2 5 His goal was to seek the progressive
destruction of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main force
battalions.
120.
121.
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The war effort was thus bifurcated. One thrust was to defeat so-called
main force enemy units-what commentators used to call the war of the
big battalions; the second thrust was to defeat a rural insurgency, the socalled other war or pacification program. Westmoreland's strategy was
to respond to complexity with complexity. In 1965 the struggle with the
Communists had escalated into a two-tiered effort with large mobile
units supported and supplied by a North Vietnamese logistics capability
and divorced from South Vietnam's civilian population on one level and
smaller guerrilla units living near or in the midst of the civilian population on the other. The search and destroy strategy took the war to the
most militarily destructive enemy units within South Vietnam and left
South Vietnamese soldiers, with their superior knowledge of the population, free to concentrate on fighting the Communists hiding in populated
areas.
On June 26, 1965, the United States Government authorized Westmoreland to
commit [United States] forces to combat, independent of or in conjunction
with [South Vietnamese] forces in any situation in which use of such
troops is requested by an appropriate [South Vietnamese] commander and
when, in [Westmoreland's] judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen
126
the relative position of [South Vietnamese] forces.
At this time Westmoreland formalized operational procedures for
United States combat units so they might pursue search and destroy missions independent from or in conjunction with South Vietnamese military forces. He adopted a technique of deployment in tactical areas of
responsibility (TAORs). 27 He assigned each unit to an area drawn on a
map. The unit's combat operations were confined to that area. TAORs
fell within the confines both of South Vietnamese provinces, which were
concurrently military zones commanded by a military officer serving both
as zone commander and as province chief, and of military regions commanded by a South Vietnamese General in which South Vietnamese divisional units engaged in combat. Assigning TAORs to United States
units provided a mechanism to coordinate with this South Vietnamese
structure to prevent the United States units from carrying the war to
places at cross-purposes with their Vietnamese allies. TAORs were also
assigned to South Vietnamese units so that all would know which unit
was primarily responsible for military activity in a given area. United
States commanders made the assignment of TAORs jointly with
126. 2 PENTAGON
127. Id. at 356; 3
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Vietnamese commanders. By defining a TAOR to exclude heavily populated areas, they could keep United States combat units away from South
Vietnam's population centers.
In 1965 and 1966, however, when United States troops commenced
combat operations in South Vietnam, not every TAOR assigned to
United States combat units completely excluded South Vietnamese civilians. At the time, many Communist main force units were hugging
populated areas of the country, especially in the coastal zones of Military
Regions I and II in Central Vietnam. Consequently, the fighting did not
follow the principle of distinction as neatly as Westmoreland had initially contemplated in United States force augmentation request of June
1965.128 The fighting did harm civilian villages, causing many casualties
and precipitating the flight of hundreds of thousands of civilians away
from the fighting into refugee camps.
In 1967 Westmoreland deployed, in consultation with South Vietnam's military leaders, nearly all United States forces farther and farther
away from populated areas as the American forces penetrated Communist base areas and pushed Communist forces toward the country's borders. By 1971 nearly all refugees had resettled in their villages as the
Communist insurgency was defeated.12 9
B.

Westmoreland's Rules of Engagement

Though not demanded by the law of war or Field Manual 27-10,
Westmoreland prescribed limitations on his troop's use of weaponry in
128.
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combat. Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington set limits on
ground operations near the borders of South Vietnam and on air raids
near North Vietnam's border with the People's Republic of China in
order to preclude unwanted international incidents resulting from United
States attacks on neutral states.1 30
In his review of United States conduct of the Vietnam war, Guenter
Lewy concluded that "[i]mpeccable rules of engagement, based on applicable legal provisions were issued, but their observance was often inadequate and the [United States] command failed to take reasonable steps to
make sure that they would be properly enforced. 13 1 He also concluded
less harshly, however, that the "MACV can justly be faulted with failing
to take all possible measures to enforce these rules, but such negligence is
a far cry from having a genocidal intent to destroy the people of South
' 13 2
Vietnam.
Other commentators have been more appreciative than Lewy of the
restrictions Westmoreland imposed on his forces to limit their discretion
over the use of force. James E. Bond, for example, praised MACV requirements for the classification of suspects to protect the rights of
133
civilians.
On September 17, 1965, Westmoreland wrote his subordinate commanders and instructed them to reduce and prevent civilian casualties.13 4
He ordered that "a conscious effort must be made to minimize battle
casualties among those non-combatants who must be brought back into
fold in the course of time" and that "the application of U.S. military

130. An Analysis of the Evolution of MACV Rules of Engagement Pertaining to
Ground Operations 1965-69 (unclassified), at 1 (documents provided by Vincent Denna,
Historian, Southeast Asia Branch, Center of Military History, Dep't of Army, Wash.
D.C.) [hereinafter Dep't of Army Documents]. The Joint Chiefs also set specifications
that the very destructive B-52 bombing missions inside South Vietnam attack no target
within one kilometer of a locality inhabited by noncombatants.
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force in Vietnam must be carefully controlled at all times."'1 5 The imexercise of
plementation of these restrictions would require, he said, "the
13 6
judgment and restraint not formerly expected of soldiers.'
Westmoreland directed his staff Judge Advocate, Colonel George S.
Prugh, to work with other MACV staff sections to formulate rules of
engagement. Because knowledge of these rules was so important to legal
conduct of hostilities, and because there was frequent rotation of individuals through command positions, Westmoreland directed that the rules
of engagement be reviewed and republished for the entire MACV command every six months. Approximately every six weeks Westmoreland
himself would meet with his top battlefield commanders at Nha Trang
or Cam Ranh to discuss developments in the ground war. He recalls
emphasizing at every meeting the importance of avoiding civilian casualprinciple of distinction, now embodied in the
ties and adhering to the
7
rules of engagement.'1
On September 7, 1965, MACV headquarters issued Directive 525-3
entitled Combat Operations: Minimizing Non-combatant Battle Casualties, which instructed United States combat commanders to "strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish their mission ... and the
high importance of reducing to a minimum the casualties inflicted on the
non-combatant populace."' 38 It directed commanders at every echelon to
consider "both the military and psychological objective of each operation."' 39 It also stated that preplanned airstrikes in populated areas and
reconnaissance by fire into hamlets were militarily counterproductive in
this kind of war.14 0 Commanders were to reduce civilian casualties
through indoctrination of troops, adoption of judicious military measures,
operabetter intelligence collection, civic action, psychological outreach
4
tions and close coordination with the South Vietnamese.1 1
On September 17, 1965, MACV headquarters issued Directive No.
525-4 entitled Tactics and Techniquesfor the Employment of US Forces
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in the Republic of Vietnam. The MACV intended this directive to promote the humane interest of protecting civilians within the combat
1 42
zone.
Directive 95-2 of July 2, 1965, which the MACV updated on December 20, 1965, specified how commanders were to employ tactical air
strikes. 143 This directive emphasized the need to reduce incidents involving friendly forces, noncombatant casualties and civilian property damage, although it sought within those strictures to obtain the full productivity of United States air power in the effort to defeat Communist main
force units. A central technique used to control tactical air strikes required the validation and approval of potential targets.1 44 All strikes on
preplanned targets required the approval of a South Vietnamese province chief or other senior South Vietnamese military commander. The
United States warned United States commanders, however, that South
Vietnamese decision-makers might not always comply with United
1 45
States targeting criteria.
Directive 95-2 required that appropriate South Vietnamese authorities
approve even air strikes made in support of United States units then in
active combat or made by an airborne observer who achieves positive
identification of the enemy. 4 6 Where United States forces desired to
make air strikes in close proximity of hamlets or villages, they had to
make the strikes at the direction of an airborne forward air controller
and only after receiving South Vietnamese approval. 4 ' The directive
permitted air attacks without prior warning to the inhabitants of hamlets
and villages only in conjunction with a ground assault and only if, in the
judgment of the assault commander, a warning would jeopardize the
mission.'"
Regarding interdiction and harassment air strikes, which are strikes
that are neither preplanned nor in support of ground troops in combat,
United States forces could not strike a target area that included a hamlet
or a village until appropriate United States and South Vietnamese authorities had approved the strike at that location. This requirement ap-

142. Dep't of Army Documents, supra note 130, at 1.
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plied even when "light fire is received from the village or hamlet."' 4 If
United States and South Vietnamese authorities approved such a strike,
they would then take control from the pilots and given it to airborne or
ground controllers, and the forces were to warn the inhabitants of the
target area using leaflets or loudspeakers in sufficient time for the inhabitants to evacuate the area in advance of the air strike. Similar rules
governed the delivery of direct fire by United States armed helicopters. 5
If a South Vietnamese province chief designated an area as a specified
strike zone, United States forces could conduct air strikes in the area
without further approval.' 51 In these zones, also called free fire zones,
anyone who remained was considered an enemy combatant and United
States forces could conduct operations there without violating the principle of distinction. 152 When the authorities updated a similar directive on
June 28, 1966, Westmoreland ordered: "Due to widespread intermingling of friendly forces and populations with enemy forces, [South
Vietnamese Government] political and tactical approval of all strikes
within [South Vietnam] is required."' 5 3
Similar restrictions existed on artillery, mortar and naval gunfire attacks.' 54 Westmoreland ordered that such attacks ensure that friendly
forces and civilians are not endangered and that "property of friendly
forces, [the South Vietnamese] and friendly civilians [are] not destroyed
or damaged."'1

55

An observer had to control all attacks against villages or

hamlets, even when known enemy targets were present in such areas,
and United States forces could execute such attacks only after the South
Vietnamese Province Chief or District Chief had approved the shelling.
When not associated with the maneuver of ground forces, the shelling of
villages and hamlets required prior warning to the inhabitants "even
though fire is received from them."' 5 6
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Populated areas were subject to attack without warning if the attack
was in conjunction with a ground operation moving ground troops
through the area and the ground commander concluded that warning
would jeopardize his mission. Directive 525-9 of February 2, 1966,
sought to protect the property of South Vietnamese civilians.15 It stated:
"That people have lived under [Viet Cong] control does not make them
irrevocably hostile ... [and] to treat them as the enemy and deny them
essential resources is incompatible with [United States and South
Vietnamese] objectives." 58 The directive prohibited the destruction of civilian dwellings. 59
In a message of October 7, 1966, Westmoreland pointed out to his
subordinates that Communist soldiers sought to provoke United States
troops into inflicting casualties on innocent civilians and thus gain a
propaganda advantage by shooting at United States forces from hamlets
or fields in which large numbers of Vietnamese were working. Westmoreland urged commanders to ensure that their troops practiced "the
utmost of fire discipline." 6 Westmoreland said: "We must become the
masters and not the victims of the Viet Cong tactic.''116 Westmoreland

exhorted his commanders to presume that the Vietnamese populace was
friendly until it demonstrated otherwise.' 6 2
Not everyone agreed that Westmoreland's rules of engagement were
desirable. In his study of United States tactics in Vietnam, Lewy noted
that combat soldiers resented waiting for bureaucratic approval before
making strikes.'6 3 On reading Westmoreland's rules of engagement after
the war was over, conservative Republican Senator Barry Goldwater
said: "I am ashamed of my country for [placing] such restrictions . . .
upon men who were trained to fight, men who were trained to make
164
decisions to win war, and men who were risking their lives.'
157. USMACV, Directive No. 525-9, Combat Operations: Control, Disposition, and
Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies, Feb. 2, 1966, quoted in Dep't
of Army Documents, supra note 130, at 16.
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Westmoreland's Treatment of Prisoners of War

It was the United States position that the third Geneva Convention
applied to the conflict then raging in South Vietnam. United States
forces were to presume that all persons they took captive were prisoners
of war, subject to immediate screening by South Vietnamese and United
States intelligence staffs for proper disposition. Custody of detained persons was the sole responsibility of the South Vietnamese Government,
because the South Vietnamese Government was the legal authority with
rights to maintain civil order in the country. Thus, as the fighting intensified, more persons came into the custody of the South Vietnamese
Government.
In 1965, however, the Government of South Vietnam had no facilities
suitable for the confinement and care of prisoners of war."6 5 The total
capacity of South Vietnam's prisons and jails was 21,400 persons. During 1965 South Vietnam had confined some 24,878 war-related prisoners."' 6 In December 1965, 18,786 persons were still in South Vietnamese
custody. Average confinement for a prisoner lasted six months. 1 7 As
United States and South Vietnamese forces apprehended new persons,
the South Vietnamese released old prisoners to make room for the new
ones.
On November 27, 1965, Westmoreland's headquarters proposed a
plan for implementation of the Geneva Conventions.1 6 They proposed
that the South Vietnamese construct five prisoner of war camps. South
Vietnamese military police would staff the camps and United States military police advisors assigned to each camp would promote adherence to
the levels of treatment specified in the third Geneva Convention. In November 1965 Westmoreland personally urged the Chief of Staff of the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces to insist that his forces adhere to the
Geneva Conventions while fighting the war.1 69 The South Vietnamese
then adopted the program that the United States had proposed and built
the camps. They later expanded the camps. By December 11, 1971, the
South Vietnamese Government held 35,665 prisoners of war in six
camps. Of these, United States units had captured 13,365.170
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In August 1966 Westmoreland again wrote his commanders to describe "active command interest" in complying with international law
concerning prisoners of war.1 1' In October 1966 Westmoreland distributed to United States forces a MACV Command information bulletin
with instruction on application of the Geneva Conventions. 1 2 On January 5, 1968, the ICRC wrote: "We are convinced that in the context of
the war in Vietnam the [United States] forces are devoting a major effort
to the spread of knowledge of the Geneva Conventions." ' 3
At United States insistence, South Vietnam permitted representatives
of the ICRC to visit South Vietnam's prisons and prisoner of war
camps. " 4 South Vietnam granted mailing privileges to the prisoners and
gave families of Viet Cong prisoners of war visitation rights to the
camps. South Vietnam also established a dispensary with a resident doctor for each camp.17 5
D. Westmoreland's Policies Concerning the Apprehension of
Individuals
Westmoreland ordered that all United States soldiers arriving in South
Vietnam be issued an instructions card for the soldiers to carry with
them at all times.17 6 The card provided directions for the apprehension
of prisoners and instructed each soldier that he must comply with the
third Geneva Convention and that he could not mistreat, humiliate or
degrade a prisoner, take his personal effects or deny him medical treatment. United States soldiers were to take prisoners to the place their
commanders designated and guard the prisoners carefully. The card car17
ried simple Vietnamese expressions for use in stopping a prisoner. 7
The back of the card said, among other things: "But [the prisoner]
must also be treated at all times as a human being. He must not be
tortured, killed, mutilated, or degraded, even if he refuses to talk ...
MISTREATMENT OF ANY CAPTIVE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. EVERY SOLDIER IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE

171. Id. at 75.
172. Id.
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FOR THE ENEMY IN HIS HANDS." ' 8 Most importantly, the card
instructed all United States military personnel that "ALL PERSONS
IN YOUR HANDS, WHETHER SUSPECTS, CIVILIANS, OR
COMBAT CAPTIVES, MUST BE PROTECTED AGAINST VIOLENCE, INSULTS, CURIOSITY, AND REPRISALS OF ANY
KIND." It admonished United States soldiers to "[1]eave punishment to
17 9
the courts and judges."
E. Westmoreland's Interrogation Practices
United States units holding captives were to hold captives only long
enough to obtain from them any legitimate tactical intelligence they
might possess. The United States units were then to take the captives to
an interrogation center staffed jointly by United States and South
Vietnamese intelligence specialists.18 0 There specialists classified the detainees and sent then for further processing depending on their status.
They sent prisoners of war to prisoner of war camps; they released innocent civilians and returned them to the place of capture; they turned
civilian suspects over to South Vietnamese police and judicial officials for
detention, possible trial, and, if found guilty, punishment; they sent those
members of the enemy apparatus who sought forgiveness for their belligerent status to a Chieu Hoi center where the prisoners benefited from
the South Vietnamese Government's amnesty program. 1"
The MACV first codified its policy regarding the classification of prisoners in Directive 381-11 of March 5, 1966. a"2 The MACV concluded
that it would accord prisoner of war status to captured South
Vietnamese nationals fighting for the Communists even though such nationals were not legally entitled to prisoner of war status because they
were rebels against their sovereign."8 3 Suspected Viet Cong captured in
circumstances that precluded their being considered as openly notorious
belligerents were to be treated as civilian criminal defendants."" The
ICRC complimented the MACV for this policy, saying it was
a brilliant expression of a liberal and realistic attitude .... This text could
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very well be a most important one in the history of humanitarian law, for
it is the first time.., that a government goes far beyond the requirements
of the Geneva Convention in an official instruction to its armed forces."8 5

F. Westmoreland's Policies Concerning the Reporting of War
Crimes
On March 25, 1966, the MACV issued Directive 20-4, which required United States soldiers to report war crimes, both those that enemy forces committed, and those that United States military personnel
committed on hostile military or civilian personnel. 86 The directive authorized brigade commanders with judge advocates assigned to their
staffs to investigate war crimes; it also authorized army officers with general court martial jurisdictions to do the same. The directive stated
bluntly that the willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, or the
willful infliction of great suffering or serious injury, to persons taking no
active part in hostilities constituted a war crime.'8 7 The directive also

prohibited firing on undefended localities, pillage or purposeless destruction."6 " In addition, all personnel having knowledge of war crimes had
an obligation to report them. The MACV reaffirmed the prohibition
against war crimes on November 9, 1967, in Directive 27-5,1' and issued four additional related directives during the war.1"'
Westmoreland demonstrated in the above ways before the Order of
Battle controversy occurred in 1967 that he was acting in compliance
with the principle of distinction to separate and protect civilians from
belligerents.
VI.

THE ORDER OF BATTLE CONTROVERSY

Controversy over who the United States should include in the Order
of Battle arose in the middle of 1967 when more accurate information on
enemy operations became available from documents and Viet Cong
records captured in 1966. As of 1965, with the introduction of United
States combat forces to fight a war of search-and-destroy missions seek185. Id. at 66.
186. USMACV, Directive No. 20-4, Inspections and Investigations: War Crimes,
Mar. 25, 1966, quoted in Dep't of Army Documents, supra note 130, at 17. See G.
PRUGH,

supra note 109, at 72, 136.

187. G. PRUGH, supra note 109, at 73.
188. Id.
189. USMACV, Directive No. 27-5, Legal Services: War Crimes and other Prohibited Acts, Nov. 9, 1967, quoted in Dep't of Army Documents, supra note 130, at 20.
190. G. PRUGH, supra note 109, at 73.
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ing out main force Communist units, the United States recorded Communist capability as consisting of combat companies, combat support
units and other irregulars. For example, when the 1965 study group of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff examined prospects for success under the proposed search-and-destroy strategy, it noted that Communist forces consisted of 48,500 men in combat companies and 17,600 in combat support
operations.' 91
Major General Joseph McChristian, who later testified against Westmoreland in the trial of Westmoreland's defamation suit against CBS,
was the Chief of Intelligence for the MACV at the time United States
forces entered Vietnam. In his history of military intelligence in Vietnam
from 1965 to 1967, McChristian reported that six months elapsed from
the time the United States decided to commit its combat forces to the
Vietnam conflict and the release of the first issue of the Military Assistance Command J-2 Order of Battle Summary.1 92 The summary consisted of thirteen pages with information organized in two parts. Part I
listed enemy units identified as main forces or local forces and as Viet
Cong or North Vietnamese. It described the existence of units as part of
the enemy's fighting force as "confirmed, probable, or possible."19' 3 Part
II provided a recapitulation of enemy forces and total enemy personnel
strength located in each military region of South Vietnam. 94
McChristian wrote that the MACV changed the format of the Order
of Battle report constantly. The MACV added new sections concerning
such subjects as Communist units newly arrived in South Vietnam, the
continued validity of treating Communist battalions as combat-effective,
and cover names that the Communists gave to their various units.'9 5 The
MACV later changed the categories of enemy forces so as to use the
headings "maneuver, combat support, administrative service, irregular,
and political."' 9 8
Preparation of the Order of Battle involved many people. McChristian
wrote:
Our order of battle reporting was reviewed by all members of the national
intelligence community. Military Assistance Command statistics and holdings concerning the enemy forces often were questioned. Several factors

4 PENTAGON PAPERS, supra note 70, at 294-95.
192. J. MCOHRISTIAN, VIETNAM STUDIES: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1965-1967, at 129 (Dep't of Army 1974).
191.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 131.
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contributed to this problem. Separate reporting channels existed between
component commands and government agencies and their headquarters
back in the United States. Everyone was forwarding order of battle information to his superiors in Washington without approval from the MACV
19 7
commander.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon first reviewed
McChristians' work product. Next, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a team
to Saigon to determine the validity of McChristian's statistics. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then directed that they have a
special conference to review the criteria, terminology and definitions that
the MACV used in the Order of Battle reports. 9 " By the end of McChristian's tour of duty in the MACV, seventy-five offices received a
total of 425 copies of the Order of Battle report.' 99 In September 1966
the principal categories in McChristian's Order of Battle were as follows: Communist Regulars (110,000), Guerrilla-militia (103,573), Service Troops (18,553) and Political Cadre (39,175) for a total of
271,301.2 ° °

In late 1966 a CIA analyst in Washington D.C. reviewed captured
Communist documents which indicated that the number of individuals
claimed by the NLF as their organized supporters and followers in the
hamlets and villages was much larger than the number of guerrilla-militia participants shown on the MACV Order of Battle. The analyst, Samuel Adams, later wrote in Harper'sMagazine that his review was "the
biggest intelligence find of the war-by far." ' ' In planning United
States war strategy, statistics were important and, to Adams, "the most
important figure of all was the size of the enemy army-that order of
battle number, 270,000. ''202 If one added Adams' numbers for the irregular component of the Order of Battle to the enemy Order of Battle, the
size of the enemy force doubled. "We'd be fighting a war twice as big as
the one we thought we were fighting."2 0 Adams added, "[T]he addition
of 200,000 men to the enemy order of battle meant that somebody had to
find an extra 600,000 troops for our side. This would put President
Johnson in a very tight fix-either quit the war or send more

197. Id. at 127.
198. Id. at 128.
199. Id. at 131.
200. Cubbage, supra note 4, at 8.
201. Adams, Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War With Numbers, HARPER'S MAG.,
May 1975, at 43.
202. Id. at 43-44.
203. Id. at 44.
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soldiers. 2 o4
Adams reported his views to his superiors, expecting great things to
happen. To his chagrin, nothing occurred. He later wrote; "I was
aghast. Here I had come up with 200,000 additional enemy troops, and
the CIA hadn't even bothered to ask me about it, let alone tell anybody
else. I got rather angry ....
Adams never addressed the question whether all the persons included
in the new documents deserved classification as enemy troops under the
law of war. He told a colleague: "Can you believe it? Here we are in the
middle of a guerrilla war, and we haven't even bothered to count the
number of guerrillas. '206 As noted above, by pursuing a strategy of guerrilla warfare, the North Vietnamese Communists did not acknowledge as
valid the principle of distinction, though for propaganda purposes they
hypocritically accused United States forces of committing crimes against
humanity in violation of the principle of distinction. The putative combatants that Adam's research emphasized were residents of hamlets and
villages who may well have been unarmed supporters or part-time supporters or not even that.
Adams' article also failed to indicate whether Adams had considered
the separation of functions between United States combat forces and the
pacification program, and between United States combat forces and the
South Vietnamese Government's obligation to secure the rural population. Adams apparently did not consider the propriety of including participants in the self-defense and the secret self-defense organizations in
the manpower pool measured by the Hamlet Evaluation Survey as the
20 7
insurgency base available to the Communists.
In any case, a controversy over the MACV's Order of Battle had now
arisen. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a review of
how the MACV had formulated the Order of Battle so that the CIA and
the military command in the field could come to agreement on the num-

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 62.
207. To give Adams some credit, he did acknowledge that classifying the enemy in a
guerrilla war is not a foolproof science. He admitted:
The questions arose in the intelligence community's mind as to whether to count a
guy that stuck a pungi stick in the ground as part of the Order of Battle. That is
among the problems which arose. It is very difficult to decide who to count. ...
Now even in the guerrillas.., you are not absolutely sure how many guerrillas to
count. The same problem arises with the self-defense ... [and] secret self-defense.
* ., It is very difficult to decide who to count.
R. ADLER, supra note 2, at 194-95.
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bers. In February 1967 McChristian and his subordinate responsible for
preparing the Order of Battle, Colonel Gains Hawkins, attended a conference in Honolulu to discuss the different perspectives. Hawkins
agreed that the reported numbers were too low. He said, "You know,
there's a lot more of those little bastards out there than we thought there
208
were."
The participants at the conference agreed that while the MACV could
not measure with precision the number of irregular fighters, the MACV
should account for such fighters in the Order of Battle. 20 9 During the
next several months Hawkins looked at the newly available intelligence
on the irregular fighters and produced seventy pages of reports detailing
his findings. The Ritz Report analyzed intelligence on the self-defense
and the secret self-defense organizations. 2 0 The Corral Report described
the political cadre structure.2 11 A major United States search and destroy
operation near South Vietnam's border with Cambodia in early 1967
had uncovered large collections of Communist documents in what was
the principal region of Communist forces in South Vietnam.2 12 Hawkins
estimated that the Communists had a total of 198,000 for the irregular
forces, including guerrilla, self-defense and secret self-defense units. This
estimate was higher than the figure of 103,573 that the Order of Battle
reports had used for that category of combatants, but it was still less
than the 300,000 estimate that Adams had calculated for the category.21 3
Similarly, the study showed that Communist political cadre included at
least 90,000 persons and not the 39,000 persons used previously.
McChristian now wanted to increase the number of enemy listed in
the Order of Battle. Like Adams, he did not ask whether the law of war
limited his discretion in defining who was the enemy. Like Adams, he
did not reflect on the advantages of listing in the Order of Battle those
combat forces that the United States military had special responsibility to
seek out and destroy, while separately listing in the Hamlet Evaluation
Survey Reports the dimensions of the insurgency base that the Government of South Vietnam was determined to address with economic, political, social and police measures.
McChristian had learned too much about insurgencies. He considered
the guerrilla fighter to be the enemy just as he considered the regular

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Adams, supra note 201, at 62.
Oubbage, supra note 4, at 19.
Id. at 89.
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soldier in uniform, marching in formation, to be the enemy. He later
wrote:
Even though a guerrilla may not carry a weapon, he certainly knows how
to sharpen and replace a pungi stake or to use a hand grenade made from
a beer can. A good intelligence officer must avoid preconceived ideas when
it comes to estimating the enemy. In Vietnam, it was necessary to discard
that our military education and extemporarily many of the conceptions
2 14
engendered.
had
periences
McChristian wanted to count everyone on the other side, so to speak, as
part of the enemy, regardless of the law of war's emphasis on the need to
distinguish combatants from noncombatants.
McChristian also wanted all United States intelligence efforts in Vietnam to report to the MACV. He was convinced that in times of war,
battlefield commanders must exercise unity of command in matters of
military intelligence.2 15 By placing all members of the enemy, including
political cadre, in the MACV Order of Battle, McChristian laid the
foundation for bureaucratic control of all intelligence that bore on enemy
capabilities. The role of other organizations in pacification and intelligence-gathering would diminish correspondingly. McChristian seems to
have assumed as well that it was the MACV's responsibility to defeat
the guerrillas as well as the main force Communist units. In this he did
not fully assent to Westmoreland's bifurcated allocation of responsibility
between the United States and the South Vietnamese. McChristian has
written:
The military problem of defeating the North Vietnamese Army and the
Viet Cong main force units on the battlefield was complicated by their
utilization of a highly centralized political movement. The Viet Cong infrastructure

. .

., composed of men, women, and children, operated as the

enemy's supply service, intelligence network, and local guerrilla force as
well as a shadow government in each village in Vietnam. If victory on the
battlefield was to be translated into a just and lasting peace, the infrastructure had to be neutralized.21
The job of reducing the threat to the infrastructure would be accomplished after McChristian left Vietnam, but by the CORDS organization advising the South Vietnamese Government.
Westmoreland established the CORDS organization at the same time
214. J. MCCHRISTIAN, supra note 192, at 10. See also Cubbage, supra note 4, at
85.
215. J. MCCHRISTIAN, supra note 192, at 8.
216. Id. at 13.
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that McChristian completed his tour in South Vietnam. This new structure resulted in the centralization of command in Westmoreland to fight
the main force war and the pacification war and a separation into two
sub-commands of the main force search-and-destroy effort and the tasks
of nation-building.
In mid-May 1967, as he was about to end his tour of service in the
MACV, McChristian asked Westmoreland to approve a cable to Washington increasing the numbers in the Order of Battle as proposed by
McChristian's staff to reflect the newly studied intelligence on irregulars
and political cadre. The request came at the end of McChristian's tour
and reflected his parochial understanding of how the United States intended to fight the war. General Westmoreland refused to approve the
cable.2"'
On May 19, 1967, the MACV held a briefing on the issue, at which
time they showed higher figures for self-defense and secret self-defense
organizations. A memorandum issued after the meeting and used as Exhibit 1519 in the Westmoreland v. CBS trial, stated:
[Tihe advisability of releasing the information presented in a [Viet Cong]
Irregular Forces strength in South Vietnam briefing without further refinement was questioned. J-2 [General McChristian] will pull together
representatives from 1O and J-3 to analyze this study in depth and to
determine how this information should be presented both officially and
publicly. [Westmoreland] requested specifically that those irregular forces
that are armed be identified.218
Years later, at the trial of his suit against CBS, Westmoreland recalled
that he had said to McChristian at the time: "Joe, we're not fighting
those people. They're civilians. They don't belong in the numerical
strength of the enemy." 2' 19 Westmoreland recalled that he only wanted to
"keep book" on the people he wanted his troops to destroy. Going after
the armed Viet Cong was fair game, he thought.2 2
Remarkably, when confronted with the controversy over the proper
place in the Order of Battle for irregular combatants, Westmoreland demanded exactly what the principle of distinction required. He wanted to
know which units were armed and which were not. Those that were
unarmed were presumptively noncombatants and deserved treatment dif-
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ferent from that designated for belligerents.2 2 x Westmoreland later
recalled:
In May of 1967 I directed that armed categories of the enemy be listed
separately from unarmed or quasi military. There were some such nonmilitary elements in the sketchy and incomplete so-called Order of Battle
that we had received from the South Vietnamese. Since the figures for
these categories were static for over a year, I did not concentrate on them
until a huge increase was reported following several months of study by
my intelligence staff. Since the Military Order of Battle represented to my
subordinate Commanders and their troops the forces we were trying to
destroy, I considered it improper, if not dangerous, to include civilians in
that category. It was American policy to avoid civilian casualties by every
practical means and to neglect that matter would be totally at odds with
the spirit of the law of war and the Geneva Conventions.222
Follow-up briefings on how to classify members of the self-defense
and the secret self-defense occurred on May 28 and June 14, 1967.223
Westmoreland's strategic thinking about the nature of the Communist
threat to South Vietnam and how best to contain it reflected his own
concerns, not the statistical presentations contained in McChristian's Order of Battle reports. In his mind Westmoreland had drawn as a fundamental point of analytical departure a distinction between enemy combat
units and the insurgency base in the rural areas from which the Communists could recruit new soldiers for their combat units. He later
recalled:
We had several types of enemy to deal with: his combat forces and their
logistical support plus his "political cadre," made up of communist functionaries, part-time defenders of hamlets and villages, and their supporters. As I assumed command in Vietnam from my predecessor, I inherited
a system under which our order of battle lumped together all of these
groups to come up with a single total estimate of enemy strength.
The system seemed to me wrong. In terms of World War II, for example, it was tantamount to arriving at a total strength of the German
Wehrmacht by including members of the Nazi Party, their secret police,
and their home guard. I wanted to change the system so that we would
know as precisely as possible what we faced in terms of armed and
equipped enemy soldiers, while at the same time recognizing the presence
221. Previously, Westmoreland had taught the law of war and the rules of the Geneva Conventions at the Command and and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. Letter from General William Westmoreland to Stephen Young, Oct. 10, 1987.
222. Westmoreland, Draft of Possible Article for Parade3 (Aug. 16, 1985) (unpublished manuscript provided to author by General Westmoreland).
223. Cubbage, supra note 4, at 89-90.
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of other elements. 224
The CIA was less concerned, however, with the law of war. They
pressed for higher numbers in the Order of Battle. The CIA considered
the Order of Battle as a measure of the enemy's capability to wage war
using all persons at its disposal, whether military or civilian. Westmoreland called this concept of manpower availability the insurgency base.
The MACV, on the other hand, considered the Order of Battle as an
identification of the armed military elements of the enemy that its
soldiers had license to kill. Westmoreland did not want to encourage or
authorize his solders to, or provide them with an excuse, to kill civilians
in violation of the law of war. Major General Phillip Davidson succeeded McChristian. Davidson agreed with Westmoreland that there
was no necessity to include the self-defense, secret self-defense and politi225
cal cadre in the MACV's Order of Battle.
To resolve the dispute over who the Order of Battle should list, a
special national intelligence estimate was ordered for presentation to
President Johnson. As part of this process, CIA analysts visited Saigon
in September, 1967 to argue their point of view with Westmoreland's
staff. During that time Westmoreland reached a compromise with
George Carver of the CIA, Adams' supervisor. Robert Komer, the
founder of the new CORDS organization to press for better results in
pacification, suggested the form of the compromise to Carver. Komer believed deeply that United States combat forces were not the best answer
to the problem that the Communist organization posed-both militarily
and politically-in the countryside. He believed that the Order of Battle
list was an inappropriate management tool for pacification. Komer proposed to Carver, therefore, that they separate the civilian component of
the insurgency from the military Order of Battle, which would reflect
only the threat from Communist ground forces. In this way Westmoreland would have a "clean," conventional Order of Battle in compliance
with the law of war, and the pacification program would have its own
unique indices to measure results in what it called the other war.226
Under this theory the estimates of Communist irregulars would increase but potential noncombatants in the insurgency base would not appear in the Order of Battle but would be listed separately in general

224. Prepared Statement by General Westmoreland to the Press 4 (Jan. 26, 1982)
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terms. At his trial Westmoreland testified that he sought the deletion of
self-defense and secret self-defense forces from the Order of Battle because he had "wanted to purify the so-called order of battle so that it
would be an order of battle in fact." 22 He stated: "I felt it was important that we sort out the enemy organization so that there would be no
ambiguity in who we were fighting, with cognizance of the fact that
there were other elements in South Vietnam associated with the Com2' 28
munist cause.
The Special National Intelligence Estimate was finished by November
1967. Referring to the status of the self-defense and the secret self-defense forces, the estimate said:
The self-defense force is described by the Communists as a military organization. It is clear, however, that its organization and mission differ
from that of village and hamlet guerrillas. Self-defense forces include people of all ages and a substantial percentage of them are females. They are
largely unarmed and only partially trained. The duties of self-defense
units include the maintenance of law and order, the construction of
bunkers and strong points, warning against the approach of allied forces,
and the defense of villages and hamlets in VC-controlled territory. Selfdefense forces do not leave their home areas, and members generally perform their duties part-time. Their existence poses an impediment to allied
sweeps and pacification, however, and in their defensive role, they inflict
casualties on allied forces.
Another element, the secret self-defense forces, operates in governmentcontrolled and contested areas. They provide a residual Communist presence in such areas and support the Communist effort primarily by clandestine intelligence activities.
...

Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still large and con-

stitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle
total.

22 9

The MACV announced this result publicly at MACV headquarters
on November 24, 1967.280 The briefing presented enemy capabilities as
follows: regular forces of 118,000, consisting of 54,000 men in North

227. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1984, at 46, col. 4.
228. Id. Then Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze testified at Westmoreland's

trial that "[w]hen you aggregate elephants and flies, you get nonsense." Cubbage, supra
note 4, at 67.
229. Special National Intelligence Estimate, No. 14.3-67, Capabilities of the
Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam 15-16, Nov. 13, 1967 (document
available from The LBJ Library, Austin, Texas).
230. Joint Exhibit No. 277, supra note 5.
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Vietnamese units and 64,000 men in Viet Cong main and local armed
units; and administrative service support staffs of 35,000 to 40,000 men,
an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 over previous estimates. 31 The briefing
continued: "Information from the documents captured this year strongly
suggests that the guerrilla forces have been considerably larger than we
had believed."2' 32 The MACV announced that it would now remove selfdefense and secret self-defense units from the Order of Battle. The old
Order of Battle had included 112,000 "irregulars," including those potential noncombatant forces, while the new Order of Battle included
70,000 to 90,000 "guerrillas"-a superficial decrease in Communist
strength.2"'
In November 1967 the MACV increased the Order of Battle numbers
but removed noncombatant forces. The total number of the enemy reported in the Order of Battle remained approximately the same, but if
one added in the numbers provided for self-defense forces, secret selfdefense forces and political cadre, the total manpower available to the
enemy was higher than ever reported before. 34 The separate listing of
enemy soldiers in the Order of Battle and less certain belligerents in
another format might have misled a casual observer, but it did not mislead those fighting the war. In addition, keeping separate lists honored
an important principle of the law of war.
The CBS documentary maintained that deletion of the self-defense
and secret self-defense forces was "a new tactic" of Westmoreland to
keep enemy strength figures down.2 35 The documentary claimed that
Westmoreland "suddenly wanted [the self-defense and secret self-defense
236
figures] treated as if they didn't exist.)
Of course, Westmoreland was well aware of efforts to fight the other
war, the war of pacification. The principal responsibility of the South
Vietnamese Government, with considerable assistance from the United
States, was the mobilization of the population of rural South Vietnam
into a political community under the sovereignty of the Government in
Saigon. In 1967 the Government had written a new constitution, presidential elections were underway, village development programs were on
the drawing board, cadre teams were promoting development projects,
231. Id. at 3.
232. Id. at 5.
233. Id. at 5-6.
234. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1967, at 2.
235. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1984, at 46, col. 4.
236. Regarding the political cadre, MACV's intelligence staff now took the position
that "politicians are normally not arranged in battalions, companies and platoons." Cubbage, supra note 4, at 67.
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and South Vietnamese police were seeking out Communist networks" of
espionage and sabotage. On the United States side, a new organization-CORDS-was being put into place under Westmoreland's supervision to coordinate United States support for pacification separately
from the main force fighting and from the economic aid mission. The
CORDS staff invented a system of estimating enemy strength in the
struggle for pacification. Entitled the Hamlet Evaluation Survey, the system also permitted senior United States officials in Saigon and Washington to assess the progress being made in building civil community in
rural Vietnam.23 Thus, South Vietnam's rural communities were not a
backwater of strategic concern. The South Vietnamese and United States
were by no means ignoring the insurgency threat.
Removing persons from the Order of Battle did not remove them from
consideration as to their impact on the war. The war was as political,
economic and psychological as it was military; the MACV's Order of
Battle addressed only one part of the communist challenge to South Vietnam. As hamlet and village residents, self-defense and secret self-defense
members were included in the population to be organized through the
many rural security and rural development programs organized by the
South Vietnamese Government.
While no doubt Westmoreland's decision in the Order of Battle controversy avoided domestic controversy at the time, it was politically necessary from another point of view. The United States principal objective
in the war was to withdraw all United States troops from Vietnam and
to reintegrate disaffected South Vietnamese with a representative government maintaining independent sovereignty in South Vietnam. To achieve
this end, it was mandatory that the United States and South Vietnam not
drive the rural population to fanatic and unyielding support for the
Communists. The United States thus devoted millions of dollars to village development. It housed, fed and educated refugees and provided
funds to reestablish the refugees' villages once United States and South
Vietnamese troops had pushed Communist forces into uninhabited jungles. In addition, the Chieu Hoi program gave members of the Viet
Cong amnesty and helped them adjust to political participation in the
South Vietnamese state.2 38 Finally, constitutional reform opened the
South Vietnamese Government structure to participation by dozens of
religions and political parties, sects and factions. Westmoreland's decision not to classify summarily, and thereby stigmatize, thousands of rural

237. See G. LEWY, supra note 131, at 125, 179, 191-95.
238. See Wosepkat, Repatriation and the Chieu Hoi Amnesty Approach in Vietnam:
Consequences and Prospects, 5 INT'L LAW. 637 (1971).
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Vietnamese as being so hostile to the Government that only their deaths
or capture would further United States war aims was in keeping with
this policy.
The Phung Hoang or Phoenix Program, 23 9 a coordinated police effort
involving the South Vietnamese Prime Minister's office and other intelligence agencies, consisted of a program to arrest political leaders of the
Communist insurgency and to try them for sedition and felonious intent
to murder and destroy property. Some commentators have luridly but
inaccurately characterized as an assassination campaign this effort to remove from the Communist Party's political leadership some 70,000 to
90,000 individuals.2 40
In the orders given to United States soldiers regarding treatment of
self-defense and secret self-defense participants, the MACV honored removal of the self-defense and the secret self-defense organizations from
the Order of Battle because the organizations were not fully confirmed,
full-time combatants. On December 27, 1967, the MACV issued Directive 381-46 concerning the criteria for classification and disposition of
detainees. 24 ' The directive instructed that United States forces should
classify a member of the self-defense or the secret self-defense as a combatant and give him prisoner of war status when the member "admits or
for whom there is proof of his having participated or engaged in combat
or a belligerent act under arms other than an act of terrorism, sabotage,
or spying.""" The directive instructed that United States forces should
classify a detained member of the self-defense or secret self-defense as a
civil detainee if the activity for which the detainee was detained did not
involve actual combat or a belligerent act under arms and no proof existed that the detainee ever participated in actual combat or belligerent
acts under arms.2 43 United States forces were to release civil detainees to
the appropriate South Vietnamese civil authorities.
The people of rural Vietnam were the intentional beneficiaries of
Westmoreland's decision. MACV Directive 381-46 offered no basis for
wanton treatment of South Vietnamese civilians. Crossing an intellectual
line and misclassifying a civilian person as the enemy or a civilian residence as an enemy facility provoked wanton and illegal destruction in a
239.
240.
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number of cases. Had Westmoreland given in to such temptation and
approved the addition of the self-defense and the secret self-defense
forces to the Order of Battle in mid-1967, he would have targeted
thousands of rural South Vietnamese for forcible suppression.
Tragically, such savagery occurred on March 16, 1968, when United
States soldiers murdered several hundred South Vietnamese civilians in
the hamlet of My Lai. 2" Had Westmoreland continued previous practices of classification and included the self-defense and secret self-defense
participants in the Order of Battle, he would have provided those guilty
of the My Lai murders with a legal defense for their actions. As it was,
at his trial for ordering those murders, Lieutenant William Calley argued that the victims had no right to life (1) because their sympathy for
the Viet Cong was so extensive and so enduring as to make them belligerents, or (2), because his commanders had previously determined the
belligerent status of the villagers so as to deny them the protections of the
245
Geneva Conventions.
To the contrary, the appellate board reviewing Calley's trial before a
military court found that individuals participate in irregular warfare as
individuals and not as members of a group and that a group, such as the
residents of My Lai, cannot be collectively branded with belligerent status as a result. 248 The board held that military courts must trace hostile
actions by irregulars to individuals one by one and that a military court
can only punish such individuals after the Court has properly established
the individual's personal guilt for the wrongs. 247 The appellate board
ruled that summary executions of persons merely under suspicion are
illegal under article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 4 8 In
particular, the appellate board found in Calley's case that "[a] status of
being a sympathizer, collaborator, or Viet Cong proper is not such provocation as would mitigate a summary execution down the scale of unlawful homicide to manslaughter. ' 249 The military court thus properly
found Calley guilty of the murder of South Vietnamese persons.
Military courts reached similar results in other cases where United
States soldiers were tried for killing rural Vietnamese in contested parts
of the country.2"' In United States v. Schultz the defendant argued that
244.
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while on ambush in contested territory he had concluded that a light in a
house during the night was a signal to the Viet Cong enemy."' The
defendant contended that his belief that the occupant of the house was an
enemy justified his removal of the occupant from the house and his killing the occupant. The defendant also testified, however, that he had
wanted to take a "gook" out and kill him to avenge two of his friends
recently killed in the war and another who had been in the hospital then
with "his guts blown out."25' 2 The review board noted that even if the
victim was an enemy belligerent, the defendant had taken him into custody and thus the victim deserved protection as a prisoner of war. 2 3 The
board ruled, however, that if there was doubt as to the status of an individual as an enemy or an innocent civilian, a soldier must seek a decision
from a competent tribunal and not take matters into his own hands.254
Finally, the victim as a civilian was to have been treated with humanity.
Under the circumstances of the case, the board concluded, the defendant's actions were unjustifiable under the law of the United States or the
255
laws of war.
The issue of how to classify for military purposes the self-defense and
secret self-defense forces first arose in early 1967. It was resolved by late
November of that year with the deletion of those units from the Order of
Battle. Prior to that decision, the MACV and, therefore, all United
States field commanders, had included the self-defense and secret selfdefense units on the Order of Battle. Thus, from the introduction of
United States ground combat troops to South Vietnam in 1965 until November 1967, there was a pretext in the Order of Battle for carrying the
war into South Vietnam's hamlets. It is to Westmoreland's credit that
when faced with this issue, he decided to delete those forces from the
Order of Battle. The My Lai murders then took place in March 1968,
after the MACV had revised the Order of Battle to exclude irregular
village and hamlet units. Calley and those guilty of similar crimes failed
to observe the distinction between opponents who may be killed in combat without incurring liability for their deaths and innocents whom one
may not harm under the law of war.
Numerous commentators who experienced the Vietnam War firsthand
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have described the law of war's inapplicability to the conflict in Vietnam
and the need for more suitable rules. For example, after the My Lai
murders became public knowledge, four United States sergeants wrote a
letter in support of the killings.25 8 In his book, One Morning In The
War, Richard Hammer described with startling realism the compulsion
to avoid the limitations that the law of war imposed on United States
soldiers in Vietnam.2" Telford Taylor echoed Hammer's sentiment, referring to United States combat infantrymen living by the unwritten rule
that they could shoot Vietnamese without question or remorse.2 58
This treatment of civilians has historical origins. Military leaders,
even United States commanders and strategists, have not always been
solicitous of civilians. During the United States Civil War, Union General William Sherman said "we are . . .fighting . . .a hostile people,
and [we] must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of
'
war, as well as their organized armies." 259
When General Sherman
burned much of Atlanta, Georgia, he defended his action as necessary to
sap his enemy's logistics capability. 6 In the late nineteenth century the
Imperial German army adopted the principle that "[w]hen the most
ruthless methods are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and

256. They wrote: "You know this is a [Viet Cong] village, they are the enemy, they
are a part of the enemy's war apparatus. Our job is to destroy the enemy, so kill them..
. I want to come home alive, if I must kill old men, women or children to make myself a
little safer, I'll do it without hesitation. Taylor, in 3 VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 133, at 388.
257. Hammer wrote:
Pretty soon you get to hate all these people. You get to fear them, too. They're all
out for your ass one way or another, out to take you for everything you've got.
You don't know which ones are your enemies .... And that all of them are something not quite human, some kind of lower order of creature. You give them
names to depersonalize them, to categorize them as you've become convinced they
ought to be categorized. They become dinks and slopes and slants and gooks, and
you begin to say, and believe, "The only good dink is a dead dink." You echo the
comments of your buddies that, "One million of them ain't worth one of us. We
should blow up all those slant-eyed bastards."
Id. at 389.
258. Id. Taylor described the rule as the "mere gook" rule, stating that you could
shoot someone who was only a "mere gook" without question or remorse. Id. at 388.
259. Quoted in Adler, Targets in War: Legal Considerations, in 3 VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 133, at 301. The zealous God of the Hebrew
Old Testament once gave authorization for total war on an enemy: "now go and smite
Amalek and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man
and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." 1 Samuel 15:3.
260. P. BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 79 (1908).
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a swift victory . . . then they must be employed."2 '
In 1902 the Imperial German army declared legitimate the destruction
of the "spiritual" power of the enemy through destruction of private
property, terrorization of inhabitants and bombardment without notice.20 2 During World War II the morale of people living in Germany
and Japan become a permissible military target for the Allied powers
opposed to Berlin and Tokyo. Accordingly, the Allies adopted aerial
bombardment of population centers as a tactic of war. The Strategic
Bombing Survey, which the United States Government undertook after
World War II, noted that the purpose of fire raids on Japan was to
"secure the heaviest possible morale and shock effect by widespread attack upon the Japanese civilian population."26 3
Gerald Adler expressed well the only moral response to this law of the
jungle:
Certainly it is difficult to compel restraint in a situation of continuing
death and violence. Nevertheless, the law has always recognized that not
all killings are murder. Justifiable or excusable killings are tragic. War is
tragic. But war and murder are not synonymous. Whether murder comes
from the action of a bullet, a shell, a bomb, a tactical concept, a strategic
plan, or a general philosophy, it remains murder. Murder of a child, a
town, or a people need not happen. A combatant nation must be prepared
to prevent murder from occurring in war or be prepared, individually and
'collectively, to be judged.264
Although concern for civilian safety principally influenced Westmoreland's decision in the Order of Battle controversy, another consideration
also affected his decisions. Chief among his other concerns was the consideration of political realities. McChristian testified on the CBS documentary and during Westmoreland's trial that Westmoreland had refused to approve McChristian's proposal to increase the numbers
reported for self-defense and secret self-defense organizations because to
do so would have been a "political bombshell. ' 26 5 The memorandum of
a discussion between Westmoreland and McChristian notes that Westmoreland and McChristian discussed the subject of how a public understandably worried about the war's progress would perceive higher
261. Adler, supra note 259, in 3 VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 133, at 289.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 321.
264. Id. at 326.
265. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1984, at 46, col. 4; B. BREWIN & S. SHAW, supra
note 6, at 318.
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numbers.2 6
It is not inappropriate for a senior military commander to take political realities into consideration. General Eisenhower became senior
United States General in the European theater in World War II precisely because he was far more alert than other generals to political issues and needs.267 Since war is the extension of politics by other means,
as Clausewitz taught, politics provides the medium in which prospects
for success in war are cultured. Commanding generals ignore politics to
the peril of their missions.
At Westmoreland's trial, plaintiff's counsel introduced cables from
Westmoreland to his immediate superior, Admiral Sharp in Honolulu,
to show that Westmoreland had wanted exploration and analysis of the
revised figures for the self-defense forces to avoid embarrassment when
they were published. 26 8 At trial Westmoreland acknowledged that when
McChristian had proposed in May 1967 to increase the Order of Battle
estimates, a second concern arose in his mind in addition to the legality
of such a characterization of those individuals: if the cable went out
without a press briefing to explain such a change in the Order of Battle,
the higher estimates would mislead many people and they would misconstrue it as a revelation with inauspicious implications for the United
States war effort.26 ' Sustaining the confidence of soldiers and the home
front is vital for any commander. Embarrassments that sap the will to
persevere lead to defeat.
However, one must separate the issue of public perception of the Order of Battle controversy from the issue of how to classify members of
the self-defense and secret self-defense organizations under the law of
war. The political ramifications in the fall of 1967 of the impression that
sudden increases in Communist capabilities were occurring were obvious
and negative. In mid-July of that year the Gallop Poll showed for the
first time that a majority of United States citizens questioned (52%) disapproved of the war as President Johnson was directing it.27 0 Only 34%

of those polled believed that the United States and the South Vietnamese
were making progress in the war. By early November of that year 57%
of those polled reported that they wanted no United States involvement
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in future Vietnam-type conflicts. 27 '
In addition, press coverage of the war was turning increasingly hostile.2 72 Westmoreland, his deputy General Creighten Abrams and their
civilian superior, Ellsworth Bunker had no illusions about the ability of
the press to understand and report fairly the subtle permutations of a
complex struggle to an increasingly- divisive domestic audience. In consultation with Ambassador Bunker, Westmoreland worried about how
best to report the decision reached in the Order of Battle Controversy.
On August 21, 1967, Abrams cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington his worry that:
[i]f the [Self-defense and Secret Self-defense] strength figures are included
in the overall enemy strength, the figure will total 420,000-431,000.
This is in sharp contrast to the current overall strength figure of about
299,000 given to the press here... We have been projecting an image of
success over the recent months and properly so. Now, when we release the
figure of 420-432,000, the newsmen will immediately seize on the point
that the enemy force had increased about 120-130,000. All the available
caveats and explanations will not prevent the press from drawing an erroneous and gloomy conclusion as to the meaning of the increase. All those
who have an incorrect view of the war will be reinforced and the task will
273
become more difficult.

In November 1967, as the Government released the Special National
Intelligence Estimate, Bunker brought a similar concern to the attention
of the White House. He warned of
the devastating impact if it should leak out (as these things often do) that
despite all our success in grinding down the [Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese] here [statistics showed] that they are really much stronger
than ever. Despite all caveats, this is the inevitable conclusion which most
4
27
of the press would reach.

In November 1967, as Westmoreland and Bunker returned to Washington to report publicly on the war, resolution of the Order of Battle
controversy was presented to the press in Saigon. Previously, United
States officials had granted Time reporters access to the same captured
Communist documents that had led to the decision to increase the esti-
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mates for the self-defense and secret self-defense organizations.27 5 Time
presented a cover story entitled "Inside the Viet Cong," which described
the degree of control the NLF had over South Vietnam. The magazine
reported that only 60% of South Vietnam's population was under Government control and that the Communists controlled "vast areas of the
countryside. '27 6 The article described how the NLF used agents for terror and tax collections. It asked how the United States and the South
Vietnamese could secure the countryside. It also depicted accurately
Westmoreland's strategy for the South Vietnamese army to concentrate
pacification efforts in the populated rural areas. 2 Most significantly,
the article would not have misled a reader as to the serious threat still
challenging the United States and South Vietnam as of late 1967. As the
article illustrates, it would be inaccurate to assert that Westmoreland's
deletion of the self-defense and secret self-defense organizations from the
Order of Battle, a classified document not released to the public, resulted
in official mischaracterization of the degree of difficulty remaining for
the pacification effort.
Westmoreland and Bunker did not use Order of Battle information in
their public remarks to sustain domestic political support for the war
effort. Time described their message as "not of a clearly foreseeable end
to the war but of heartening movement toward that end. 2' 7 8 Time
quoted Westmoreland and Bunker as saying that of South Vietnam's
population, 68% was now under Government control, a gain of 12% in
the year, but 17% was under the Communist control and 15% lived in
contested areas.2 7 9 The figure for the Communist-controlled population
would give the Communists ready access to nearly two million people,
hardly a negligible threat. To reassure the United States people, Westmoreland and Bunker pointed to the decrease in recruitment of Communist soldiers and the better performance of the South Vietnamese
Army.28 Newsweek quoted Bunker as placing reliance for optimism on
the new constitution and presidential government recently elected in Saigon and on progress in pacification.28 ' Westmoreland said he had
reached the point where the end begins to come into view: the pullout of
United States troops could begin in two years.2 82 Westmoreland
275. The War: The Organization Man, TIME, Aug. 25, 1967, at 21.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 21-25.
278. The War: Progress, TIME, Nov. 24, 1967, at 22.
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280. Id. at 23.
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282. Id.
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predicted:
[T]he Communist infrastructure will be cut up and near collapse; the
Vietnamese Government will prove its stability, and the Vietnamese Army
will show that it can handle the Viet Cong; [United States] units can begin to phase down as the Vietnamese Army is modernized and develops its
bases and ports will be
capacity to the fullest; the military physical assets,
28 3
progressively turned over to the Vietnamese.

His prediction came true. Under President Richard Nixon, withdrawal
of United States combat forces began in 1969.
Deceit to sustain morale is unacceptable. CBS alleged that Westmoreland had engaged in deceit when he threw roadblocks in the way of a
quick expansion of the Order of Battle. If, to the contrary, he had other
policy reasons to question presentation of the Order of Battle, then one
cannot consider deceit to be his principal motivation.
Significantly, Westmoreland's decision in the Order of Battle controversy anticipated additions to the law of war made in 1977 at a United
Nations conference in Geneva. The Conference added provisions to the
Geneva Conventions in the form of two protocols (Additional Protocols I
and 11).28' Additional Protocol I gives belligerent status, and thus the
rights and duties of international law, to forces fighting wars of national
liberation, which it defines as armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. 85 From the
perspective of the Communists in the Vietnam War and their sympathiz283. Beginning of the End?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1967, at 28.
284. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, Annexes 1 & 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (Protocol I), 1442 (Protocol II) (1977); Official Document Section, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (Protocol I), 502
(Protocol II) (1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I and III. See K. SUTER, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF LAW-MAKING
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ers, the Vietnam War would have been such a conflict.
Article 45 of Additional Protocol I provides that any persons "who
take part in hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse party shall
be presumed to be a prisoner of war."2'86 Article 48 mandates that "[in
order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives.12

7

Article 50(3) specifies that "[tihe

presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come
within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its
civilian character.)

2 88

As applied to the Order of Battle controversy, these provisions would
require that commanders not consider members of the self-defense and
secret self-defense to be combatants. Only if the units carried arms
openly in military engagements could commanders consider them to be
combatants.28 9 Article 51(3) makes this point very clear: "Civilians shall
enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities. 290
Additional Protocol II provides protection for the victims of non-international armed conflicts. It affirms the right of states to use all legitimate
means to maintain or reestablish law and order and to defend their national unity and territorial integrity. Under article 4 of Additional Protocol II, all persons who do not take part or who have ceased to take part
in hostilities are entitled to respect and human treatment. 9 " Article
13(3) repeats the provision of Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I that
"civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."29' 2 The 1977 additions
to the law of war thus explicitly preserve the principle of distinction
protective of civilians, the same principle that was in Westmoreland's
mind when he questioned the belligerency status of the self-defense and
secret self-defense units in the Vietnam War.
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VII.
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CONCLUSION

Westmoreland's decision to delete the self-defense and the secret selfdefense units from the MACV's Order of Battle was a principled one,
not an indefensible deceitful one. The decision was the only moral and
humane alternative given the circumstances of the controversy. That
CBS should have overlooked this aspect of the dispute between Westmoreland and Samuel Adams does not speak well for the network's thoroughness or for its sensitivity to the people of rural South Vietnam.
It may appear Panglossian to apply the rule of law to the conduct of
war-even to a foreign-provoked, civil-war surrogate insurgency like the
Vietnam War. But is the alternative choice of wanton use of force, with
battlefield commanders under no restraint, more acceptable? We should
commend General Westmoreland for his efforts, limited by circumstances and human nature as they were, to adhere to the norms of restraint in the most difficult undertaking in recent United States history.

